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Divide and Conquer: SEC Discipline of Litigation
Attorneys
JULIE ANDERSEN HILL*
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") can investigate and
discipline attorneys for "unethical or improper professional conduct." Although
the SEC's disciplinary authority extends to all attorneys, for more than 70 years it
only investigated transactional attorneys. Recently, however, the SEC announced
that it is now investigating litigation attorneys for professional misconduct.
This Article examines the problems that arise because the SEC staff that is
investigating and prosecuting a client is also allowed to investigate the
professional conduct of the litigator representing that client. The Article explains
that the SEC's rules governing litigator conduct are unclear and therefore
susceptible to agency abuse. The SEC can use ethics investigations (or even
threats of investigations) to remove attorneys from cases or to intimidate
attorneys into less zealous advocacy. During ethics investigations, the SEC can
further erode the attorney-client relationship by pressing litigators for confiden-
tial information ordinarily protected by the attorney-client privilege. By dividing
the client from the attorney, the SEC can gain the upper hand in its investigation
of the client. Because of these problems, the SEC should not investigate litigators
for professional misconduct. Instead, litigators' ethical lapses should be investi-
gated by state attorney disciplinary agencies, or, if the allegations are very
serious, by criminal authorities. The SEC can then impose reciprocal discipline.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, legal scholarship has closely examined Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC")' efforts to discipline attorneys for unethical
behavior.2 This scholarship has focused primarily on the ethical duties of
1. The SEC is the regulatory agency charged with administering and enforcing federal securities law. 15
U.S.C. § 78d (2000). The agency is headed by a five-member Commission (the "Commission") appointed by
the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate. Id. In addition, numerous "officers, attorneys,
economists, examiners, and other employees" (the "staff') assist the Commission in "carrying out its functions
under the securities laws." 5 U.S.C. § 4802 (2000).
2. See, e.g., Keith R. Fisher, The Higher Calling: Regulation of Lawyers Post-Enron, 37 U. MICH. J.L.
REFoRM 1017 (2004); Stephen Fraidin & Laura B. Mutterperl, Advice for Lawyers: Navigating the New Realm
of Federal Regulation of Legal Ethics, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 609 (2003); Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Climbing "Up
the Ladder": Corporate Counsel and the SEC's Reporting Requirements for Lawyers, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 511
SEC DISCIPLINE OF LMGATION AI'ORNEYs
transactional attorneys who help clients prepare registration statements or other
documents filed with the SEC.3 Transactional attorneys are, however, only a
portion of the attorneys who interact with the SEC. Attorneys regularly represent
clients involved in SEC inquiries, formal investigations, and administrative
proceedings.4 These litigation attorneys5 help clients respond to subpoenas,
prepare clients to testify, represent clients during testimony, file written
submissions, appear before administrative law judges ("ALJs"), and perform a
number of other tasks. Although both transactional attorneys and litigation
attorneys are governed by the SEC's Rules of Practice,6 there has been little
analysis of the SEC's discipline of litigators.
The scholarly focus on transactional attorneys as opposed to litigators is
understandable. Historically, the SEC has concentrated its efforts on regulating
transactional attorneys. The SEC's early administrative actions under the Rules
of Practice were brought against transactional attorneys.7 SEC officials even
publicly announced that they would use great restraint in investigating and
(2004); Peter J. Henning, Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307 and Corporate Counsel: Who Better to Prevent Corporate
Crime?, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 323 (2002); Sung Hiu Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside
Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 983 (2005); M. Peter Moser & Stanley Keller, Sarbanes-Oxley
307: Trusted Counselors or Informers?, 49 VILL. L. REv. 823 (2004); Lisa H. Nicholson, Sarbox 307's Impact
on Subordinate In-House Counsel: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 2004 MICH. ST. L. Rev. 559 (2004);
Michael A. Perino, SEC Enforcement of Attorney Up-the-Ladder Reporting Rules: An Analysis of Institutional
Constraints, Norms and Biases, 49 VILL. L. REv. 851 (2004); Darlene M. Robertson & Anthony A. Tortora,
Reporting Requirements for Lawyers Under Sarbanes-Oxley: Has Congress Really Changed Anything?, 16
GEO. J. LEGAL ETmics 785 (2003); Mark A. Sargent, Lawyers in the Moral Maze, 49 VILL. L. REv. 867 (2004);
Marc I. Steinberg, Lawyer Liability After Sarbanes-Oxley - Has the Landscape Changed?, 3 Wyo. L. REv. 371
(2003).
3. See supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., Sidley, Our Practices: SEC Enforcement, http://www.sidley.com/secenforcement/ (last visited
Apr. 7, 2009) ("Our adversarial skills cover the full spectrum of securities enforcement matters, from defending
investigations to litigating unsettled cases in federal court or before administrative and regulatory tribunals.");
Skadden, Securities Enforcement and Compliance, http://www.skadden.com/Index.cfm?contentlD=
47&practicelD=97&focuslD= 1 (last visited Apr. 7, 2009) ('The Securities Enforcement and Compliance
Group at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP... represents public companies, financial services firms,
audit firms and their senior management, partners and employees in investigations and enforcement
proceedings brought by the SEC ... ").
5. Throughout this paper the terms "litigation attorney" and "litigator" are used broadly to mean attorneys
who represent clients in informal inquiries, formal investigations, administrative proceedings, or court
proceedings.
6. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.100-201.1106 (2006).
7. See, e.g., Carter, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC Docket 292 (Feb. 28, 1981) (declining to
discipline two transactional attorneys who had not reported accounting problems to securities regulators);
Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Exchange Act Release No. 15,982, 17 SEC Docket 1149 (July 2, 1979)
(instituting administrative proceedings under SEC ethics rules against a law firm that had performed
transactional work); Schwebel, Securities Act Release No. 4304, Exchange Act Release No. 5424, 40 S.E.C.
347 (Nov. 17, 1960) (disciplining a transactional attorney who had assisted a client in preparing false SEC
filings); Fleischmann, Unclassified Release No. 115, 37 S.E.C. 832 (June 6, 1950) (same). See also Harvey L.
Pitt & Dixie L. Johnson, Justice Delayed, Justice Denied: Observations on the SEC's 'Kern' Decision,
N.Y. L. J., July 11, 1991, at 4 ("For at least two decades, and perhaps longer, the SEC has been obsessed with
influencing the critical functions corporate lawyers assume in our society.").
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bringing administrative ethics actions against litigation attorneys. 8 In fact, at
some points, the Commission 9 may have completely forgotten that litigation
attorneys even existed. 10
In recent years, the focus on transactional securities attorneys only increased.
Large-scale financial scandals brought attention to corporate fraud and attorneys'
roles in enabling that fraud." As a result, interest grew in having transactional
attorneys serve as "gatekeepers" responsible for protecting the public. 12 The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley") 13 and accompanying regula-
tions (the "Sarbanes-Oxley Rules")14 solidified transactional attorneys' gatekeep-
ing role by requiring them to report violations of securities laws to corporate
executives. 15 Litigation attorneys, on the other hand, escaped public scrutiny and
were exempted from Sarbanes-Oxley's mandatory fraud reporting require-
ments. 16
Recently, however, the SEC has begun to scrutinize the conduct of litigation
attorneys. Under the SEC's Rules of Practice, the SEC may investigate and
discipline any attorney for "unethical or improper professional conduct." 17 In
early 2008, the SEC instituted its first ever administrative proceeding against a
litigation attorney based solely on charges of "unethical or improper professional
8. See Edward F. Greene, SEC General Counsel's Remarks on Lawyer Disciplinary Proceedings, 14 SEc.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 168 (1982).
9. See supra note 1 (describing the Commission).
10. In one attorney discipline decision, the Commission noted:
Very little of a securities lawyer's work is adversary in character. He doesn't work in courtrooms
where the pressure of vigilant adversaries and alert judges checks him. He works in his office where
he prepares prolpectuses, proxy statements, opinions of counsel, and other documents that we, our
staff, the financial community, and the investing public must take on faith.
Fields, Securities Act Release No. 5404, 2 SEC Docket 3, 4 n.20 (June 18, 1973).
11. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58
Bus. LAW. 143, 143-44 (2002).
12. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLuM. L.
REv. 1293 (2003) [hereinafter Coffee, The Attorney as Gatekeeper]; John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron:
"It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57 Bus. LAW 1403 (2002); Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr. & Eugene R.
Gaetke, The Ethical Obligation of Transactional Lawyers to Act as Gatekeepers, 56 RurGERS L. REV. 9 (2003).
13. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of
11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is also known as the Public Company
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002. Throughout this Article it will be referred to simply as
Sarbanes-Oxley.
14. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 8185,
Exchange Act Release No. 47,276, Investment Company Release No. 25,919, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Jan. 29, 2003)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. V 2005); 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2007).
16. An attorney need not report potential securities violations if "retained... to assert, consistent with his or
her professional obligations, a colorable defense on behalf of the issuer (or the issuer's officer, director,
employee, or agent, as the case may be) in any investigation or judicial or administrative proceeding relating to
such evidence of a material violation." 17 C.FR. § 205.3(b)(6) (2007).
17. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2006). This section is commonly referred to as Rule 102(e).
SEC DISCiPLINE OF LITIGATION ATTORNEYS
conduct."1 8 According to SEC Assistant General Counsel, Richard M. Humes,
the SEC is currently investigating a number of complaints that litigation
attorneys have acted unethically by destroying documents, suborning perjury, or
obstructing SEC investigations. 9 Because these SEC investigations are confiden-
tial,20 it is impossible to determine the number of investigations currently
pending. However, Mr. Humes has stated that the "steady stream",21 of ethics
complaints regarding litigation attorneys is large enough that the SEC "created a
new unit within the Office of the General Counsel" to investigate and prosecute
them.22
In light of the SEC's new policy of investigating and bringing administrative
actions against litigation attorneys, this Article examines the question of whether
the SEC should investigate and discipline litigation attorneys. The Article begins
with a description of the SEC ethics rules and an explanation of the process for
disciplining litigators.23 The Article then examines problems with these rules and
processes. First, the ethical standards governing SEC litigator conduct are not
clear.24 Second, and more importantly, the SEC's aggressive investigation of
litigation attorneys for alleged ethical violations can pit the litigation attorney
against the client. This may deny clients their right to counsel of choice25 and
give the SEC access to otherwise privileged material.26 In essence, the SEC
staff's ability to investigate litigators for "unethical or improper professional
conduct" gives it the upper hand in any investigation of the attorney's client.
The Article then explores possible ways to eliminate the harm caused by SEC
ethics investigations of litigators. Part V.A evaluates the possibility of waiting for
courts to remedy fairness concerns, but concludes this solution is likely to be time
consuming. Part V.B evaluates statutory and rule changes that would, among
18. Altman, Exchange Act Release No. 57,240, 92 SEC Docket 1424 (Jan. 30, 2008) (order instituting
administrative proceedings) (alleging that an attorney representing a client before the Commission attempted to
negotiate a favorable severance package with the client's former employer by offering that the client would not
cooperate with a pending SEC investigation into the employer's conduct). For a more extensive discussion of
this case, see notes 111-120 and accompanying text.
19. Richard M. Humes, SEC Assistant General Counsel, Ethics Panel Discussion at SEC Speaks (Feb. 10,
2007) (recording available from Practising Law Institute) [hereinafter Humes, SEC Speaks 2007]. See also
Trautman Wasserman & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 55,989, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,880,
90 SEC Docket 2832, 90 SEC Docket 2832, 2835-36 (June 29, 2007) (discussing an ethics investigation of a
litigation attorney); Giovanni P. Prezioso, SEC General Counsel, Remarks at the Spring Meeting of the
Association of General Counsel (Apr. 28, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speechl
spch042805gpp.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2009) (stating that the SEC was investigating complaints of alleged
"subornation of perjury" and "alteration of documents").
20. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
21. Richard M. Humes, SEC Assistant General Counsel, Ethics Panel Discussion at SEC Speaks (Feb. 9,
2008) (recording available from Practising Law Institute) [hereinafter Humes, SEC Speaks 2008].
22. Humes, SEC Speaks 2007, supra note 19.
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part 1m1.
25. See infra Part IV.A.
26. See infra Part IV.B.
2009]
THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHics
other things, create a truly independent division within the SEC to investigate
ethical complaints concerning attorneys. While this approach has some appeal,
the Article ultimately concludes that Congress should prevent the SEC from
investigating litigation attorneys for "unethical or improper professional con-
duct.",27 Instead, the SEC should refer ethics matters to state attorney disciplinary
authorities, or, in the, case of particularly egregious conduct, to criminal
authorities. Once these independent authorities have investigated and disciplined
the attorney, the SEC could then impose reciprocal discipline. This approach is
preferable because state disciplinary agencies and criminal authorities are
completely independent from the SEC and have long track records of disciplining
litigators.
II. SEC RULES GOVERNING LmGATOR CONDUCT
Like courts, the Commission and SEC ALJs have the authority to discipline
attorneys for contemptuous conduct that occurs in their presence during an
administrative proceeding.28 If this power of contempt were the only avenue for
the SEC to discipline a litigator, the SEC's authority would be unremarkable.2 9
But it is only the tip of the iceberg.
The SEC's primary authority to discipline litigators is Rule 102(e). 30 Rule
102(e) gives the SEC authority to censure, temporarily suspend, or permanently
disbar professionals from practicing before the SEC.31 Rule 102(e) applies to all
attorneys "practicing before" the SEC, including litigation attorneys.32 Under
Rule 102(e) an attorney may be disciplined for (1) failing "to possess the
requisite qualifications to represent others," (2) "lacking... character or integrity
or [engaging] in unethical or improper professional conduct," or (3) "willfully
violat[ing] ... any provision of the Federal securities laws."3 3 In addition, the
27. See infra Part V.C.
28. The SEC Rules state:
[C]ontemptuous conduct by any person before the Commission or a hearing officer during any
proceeding ... shall be grounds for the Commission or the hearing officer to [e]xclude that person
from such hearing ... and/or [s]ummarily suspend that person from representing others in the
proceeding in whicli such conduct occurred for the duration, or any portion, of the proceeding.
17 C.FR. § 201.180(a)(1) (2006).
29. See infra Part V.C (explaining why the power of contempt poses little threat to the fairness of SEC
proceedings).
30. See 17 C.FR. § 201.102(e)(1) (2006). Until 1995, Rule 102(e) was known as Rule 2(e). 17 C.FR.
§ 201.2(e) (1994);. SEC Rules of Practice, 60 Fed. Reg. 32,738, 32,739 (1995) (explaining that the Rules of
Practice were renumbered). Rule 102(e) became statute in 2002 as part of Sarbanes-Oxley. Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 § 602 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-3). To avoid confusion,
throughout this Article, the rule and the statute will be referred to as Rule 102(e).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1).
32. Id. § 201.102(0. Rule 102(e) also applies to accountants and other professionals who practice before the
SEC. Id.
33. Id. at § 201.102(e)(1).
[Vol. 22:373
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SEC may discipline attorneys who have been disciplined by another bar,
convicted of a crime, or punished under civil securities laws.3 4
In addition to Rule 102(e), the rules implementing Sarbanes-Oxley provide
ethical guidelines for some litigators.35 However, the Sarbanes-Oxley Rules do
not apply to all litigators; they only apply to attorneys who represent issuers.36
Litigators who represent individuals or non-issuer companies are not covered by
the Sarbanes-Oxley Rules.37
Provided that a litigator does represent an issuer, the Sarbanes-Oxley Rules
describe when the litigator may reveal confidential client information.38 In
addition, the Sarbanes-Oxley Rules describe the responsibilities of supervising
and subordinate attorneys. 39 However, the most well-known Sarbanes-Oxley
Rule-the Rule requiring attorneys to report securities violations to corporate
34. Id. at § 201.102(e)(2) (stating that the SEC may suspend an attorney who is disbarred by another court or
convicted of a crime involving "moral turpitude."). See also id. at § 201.102(e)(3)(i) (stating that the SEC may
temporarily suspend an attorney if the attorney is "by name [p]ermanenly enjoined by any court . .. from
violating or aiding or abetting the violation of any... federal securities laws" or if the attorney is found to have
willfully violated federal securities laws). The SEC routinely suspends attorneys who have been civilly
sanctioned for securities law violations. See, e.g., Marks, Exchange Act Release No. 50,432, 83 SEC Docket
2419 (Sept. 23, 2004) (suspending an attorney who was previously convicted of securities fraud); Campbell,
Exchange Act Release No. 43,136, 72 SEC Docket 2570 (Aug. 10, 2000) (temporarily suspending an attorney
who was previously enjoined from committing future securities law violations).
35. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
36. 17 C.F.R § 205.2(a)(1)(ii) (2007) (explaining that the Sarbanes-Oxley Rules extend to those
"[riepresenting an issuer in a Commission administrative proceeding or in connection with any Commission
investigation, inquiry, information request, or subpoena"). An "issuer" is a company with publicly traded stock
or registered securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 7201(a)(7) (2003).
37. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a)(1)(ii); Thomas Lee Hazen, Administrative Law Controls on Attorney Practice -
A Look at the Securities and Exchange Commission's Lawyer Conduct Rules, 55 AamiN. L. REv. 323, 343
(2003).
38. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (2007). The Sarbanes-Oxley Rules state:
An attorney appearing and practicing before the Commission in the representation of an issuer may
reveal to the Commission, without the issuer's consent, confidential information related to the
representation to the extent the attorney reasonably believes necessary:
(i) To prevent the issuer from committing a material violation that is likely to cause substantial
injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or investors;
(ii) to prevent the issuer, in a Commission investigation or administrative proceeding from
committing perjury, ... suborning perjury, ... or committing any act ... that is likely to
perpetrate a fraud upon the Commission; or
(iii) To rectify the consequences of a material violation by the issuer that caused, or may cause,
substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or investors in the furtherance
of which the attorney's services were used.
Id.
39. A supervisory attorney must make "reasonable efforts to ensure that a subordinate attorney... conforms
to this part." Id. at § 205.4. A subordinate employee must comply with the Rules "not withstanding that the
subordinate attorney acted at the direction of or under the supervision of another person." Id. at § 205.5(b).
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management--does not apply to litigators.4 °
The Sarbanes-Oxley Rules provide an avenue for attorney discipline indepen-
dent of Rule 102(e). 41 The SEC may bring an administrative disciplinary
proceeding against any attorney suspected of violating the Sarbanes-Oxley
Rules.42 If the Commission determines that the attorney has violated the
Sarbanes-Oxley Rules, that attorney may be censured, or temporarily or
permanently suspended.43
The SEC's Office of the General Counsel is tasked with investigating and
prosecuting possible violations of the SEC's attorney practice rules under both
Rule 102(e) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Rules.4 This does not, however, mean the
Office of the General Counsel pro-actively monitors attorney conduct, watching
for potential violations. Rather, the Office of the General Counsel investigates
40. Id. at § 205.3(b).
41. In adopting the Sarbanes-Oxley Rules, the Commission noted that an early draft of the Rules had
"created confusion as to whether the Commission would treat violations of the [R]ule[s] as... a violations of
Rule 102(e)." Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6314
(Feb. 6, 2003). The final version of the Sarbanes-Oxley Rules included amendments to "emphasiz[e] that the
Commission intends to proceed against individuals violating [the Rules] as it would against other violators of
the federal securities laws and, where appropriate, to initiate proceedings under [the Rules] seeking an
appropriate disciplinary sanction," Id.
Nevertheless, conduct that violates the Sarbanes-Oxley Rules also violates Rule 102(e). Sarbanes-Oxley
instructed the SEC to implement rules "setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys."
15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. V 2005). Consequently, any attorney who violates the Sarbanes-Oxley Rules will have
engaged in "improper professional conduct" and be subject to the sanctions of Rule 102(e). As a practical
matter, it makes little difference whether disciplinary sanctions are imposed under Rule 102(e) or the
Sarbanes-Oxley Rules. Both include the same penalties-censure, temporary suspension, or permanent
suspension. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 205.6(b) with 17 C.FR. § 201.102(e)(1).
42. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.6(b).
43. Id. at § 205.6(b). In addition to its administrative powers over attorneys, the SEC has the power to seek
"civil or administrative remedies for violation of the federal securities laws," including the Sarbanes-Oxley
Rules. 17 C.F.R. § 205.6(a). See also 15 U.S.C. § 7202 (2003) (noting that the SEC has authority to punish
violations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act the same as violations of the Securities Exchange Act). This includes civil
enforcement actions and administrative cease-and-desist orders. Id. at § 78u-2 (providing for civil monetary
penalties); id. at § 78u-3 (providing for cease-and-desist orders). So far, the SEC "has not brought any [civil]
enforcement actions under [the Sarbanes-Oxley Rules]." Richard M. Humes, Remarks of an SEC Associate
General Counsel, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 341, 348 (2007) [hereinafter Humes, Remarks]. In 2001, SEC
officials suggested that cease-and-desist proceedings might be used against attorneys in place of Rule 102(e)
proceedings. See Rachel Witmer, SEC May Consider Cease and Desist to Sanction Attorneys for Misconduct,
33 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 358 (2001) (reporting on comments by then SEC General Counsel David
Becker). However, the SEC has not since brought a cease-and-desist proceeding against an attorney for
professional ethical deficiencies. Because it appears that these enforcement mechanisms will not be used against
litigation attorneys in the near future,' they will not be discussed further.
44. See 17 C.F.R. § 200.21 (stating the General Counsel is responsible "for the conduct of administrative
proceedings relating to the disqualification of lawyers from practice before the Commission [and] for
conducting preliminary investigations ... into potential violations of [Rule 102(e)]"). See also STUART R.
COHN, 2 SEC CoUNSELING FOR SMALL & EMERGING CoMArNS § 21.14 (2007); SEC, Office of the General
Counsel, http://www.sec.gov/aboutlofficeslogc.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2009) (noting that the Office of the
General Counsel's general litigation group "litigates administrative disciplinary proceedings against attorneys
under Rule 102(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice").
SEC DISCIPLINE OF LITIGATION ATroRNEYS
complaints raised by SEC staff. The most likely source of a complaint about a
litigator is the SEC's Division of Enforcement. The SEC rules governing formal
Division of Enforcement investigations provide that SEC staff "conducting the
investigation may report to the Commission any instances where any... counsel
has been guilty of dilatory, obstructionist or contumacious conduct during the
course of an investigation or any other instance of violation of [SEC] rules. 45 In
practice, the complaints are directed not to the Commission, but to the Office of
the General Counsel.46
Attorney ethics investigations are governed by the same rules used by the
Division of Enforcement in investigating securities law violations.47 Under the
delegation of authority in SEC rules, the Office of the General Counsel may begin
an informal investigation into an attorney's conduct without authorization from
the Commission.4 8 During an informal investigation, the Office of the General
Counsel may ifiterview cooperative witnesses, but it cannot compel testimony or
issue compulsory process.49 In order for the Office of the General Counsel to
compel testimony or issue process, the Commission must issue a formal order of
investigation.5° Both informal and formal investigations are non-public.5 1 In fact,
the SEC staff may, but need not, disclose to attorneys being investigated "the
general nature of the investigation, including the indicated violations as they
pertain to them.",52 The SEC also need not inform the client represented by the
attorney under investigation. The SEC is only required to show a person a copy of
the formal order of investigation if that person is "compelled or requested to
furnish documentary evidence or testimony at a formal investigative proceed-
ing[.]
' 53
Unless the SEC's contemplated disciplinary action against an attorney is based
on disbarment in another jurisdiction, conviction of a crime, or issuance of a
cease and desist order with respect to securities law violations, the -SEC must
45. 17 C.F.R. § 203.7(e). "Dilatory" conduct is conduct "tending to cause delay." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY
488 (8th ed. 2004). "Obstructionist" conduct is "[i]nterference with the orderly administration of law and
justice." Id. at 1107. "Contumacious" conduct is "[a) willful disobedience of a court order." Id. at 315.
46. See Humes, Remarks, supra note 43, at 345; Prezioso, supra note 19 (noting that "investigations of
professional misconduct by attorneys are not handled by lawyers in the Enforcement Division who may have
dealt with those attorneys in pending cases, but instead are referred to the Office of the General Counsel for
investigation and, if appropriate, enforcement proceedings").
47. Humes, SEC Speaks 2007, supra note 19 (stating that in Rule 102(e) investigations the SEC is "abiding
by the same rules and procedures that the Enforcement Division adheres to").
48. See 17 C.ER. § 200.21; SEC Description of Duties of the General Counsel, 71 Fed. Reg. 27,385-01 (May
11, 2006) (noting that the rule codified at 17 C.F.R. § 200.21 allows "the General Counsel to [conduct]
preliminary investigations, in which no process is issued or testimony compelled, where it appears that an
attorney may have violated Rule 102(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice").
49. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.21, 202.5.
50. See id. §§ 200.21,202.5.
51. See id. §§ 202.5(a), 203.5.
52. See id. § 202.5(b).
53. Id. at § 203.7(a).
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provide the attorney "notice and opportunity for hearing., 54 If the Office of the
General Counsel, through the evidence collected during its investigation,
believes the SEC should take disciplinary action against an attorney, it must ask
the Commission to issue an "Order for Proceedings. 55 It is the SEC's practice to
allow the accused attorney the opportunity to provide the Commission with a
Wells submission explaining why disciplinary action is not warranted.56 If the
Commission decides to issue an Order for Proceedings, the Order will inform the
accused attorney of the SEC's allegations.
The hearing itself is held before an ALJ.5 7 All hearings are "public unless
otherwise ordered by the Commission on its own motion or after considering the
motion of a party. '58 The Conmmssion reviews the ALJ's decision. 59 The
Commission's decision can be appealed to the United States Court of Appeals.6°
An attorney suspended from practicing before the SEC may, at any time, apply
to be reinstated.6' The Commission may, in its discretion, allow the suspended
attorney to present evidence at a hearing.62 The Commission may only reinstate
an attorney if it determines there is "good cause" for reinstatement.63
III. UNCERTAIN RULES FOR LITIGATORS
As is evident from Part II of this Article, Rule 102(e) and the Sarbanes-Oxley
Rules are long on penalties and procedures. However, they provide little
guidance concerning what a litigation attorney should or should not do. Neither
set of rules clearly defines the ethical standards for SEC litigators. Litigators are
told that "unethical or improper professional conduct" is prohibited,"' but what
does that mean? The SEC failed to conclusively answer this question in its 1981
54. Id. at § 201.102(e) (2005). See also id. at § 205.6 (requiring an "administrative disciplinary hearing" for
attorneys disciplined under the Sarbanes-Oxley Rules).
55. Id. at § 201.300.
56. "Pursuant to 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c), persons involved in an SEC investigation may submit a written
statement[, a Wells submission,] to the SEC before its staff seeks approval for an action from the Commission."
SEC v. Zahareas, 374 F.3d 624, 629 (8th Cir. 2004). See also Humes, SEC Speaks 2007, supra note 19
(explaining that the SEC uses the Wells process when the Commission considers whether an administrative
action should be brought under Rule 102(e)).
57. See 17 C.ER. § 201.110.
58. Id. at § 201.102(e)(7). Prior to 1988, Rule 102(e) hearings were non-public. See Disciplinary Proceeding
Involving Professionals Appearing or Practicing Before the Commission, 56 Fed. Reg. 26,427-01, 26,427-34
(July 13, 1988) (explaining the reasons for the rule change).
59. 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.360, .410, .411.
60. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77i(a), 78y (2006). The appeal may be brought in the circuit where the attorney resides
.or in the Circuit for the District of Columbia. 15 U.S.C. § 78y.
61. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(5). See, e.g., Schimmel, Securities Act Release No. 6531, 30 SEC Docket 473
(May 2, 1984) (reinstating an attorney who was previously suspended from practicing before the Commission).
62. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(5).
63. Id.
64. Id. at § 201.102(e)(l)(ii).
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case In re Carter 65 and has made little progress on the subject since. Without
further guidance, litigation attorneys cannot tell what actions might subject them
to investigation and discipline.66 In addition, the SEC's ethical rules governing
litigators do not specify the mental state necessary to punish attorneys for
"unethical or improper professional conduct. '67 For example, it is unclear
whether an attorney who acts negligently is subject to discipline.68
A. UNETHICAL OR IMPROPER PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
As explained in Part H, Rule 102(e) allows the SEC to discipline attorneys who
engage in "unethical or improper professional conduct., 69 Neither the SEC Rules
nor subsequent case law explain what constitutes "unethical or improper
professional conduct."
1. UNCERTAIN SEC RuLEs
Rule 102(e) does not define "unethical or improper professional conduct" with
respect to attorneys. An examination of the history of the SEC's Rules of Practice
sheds further light on how the SEC may interpret Rule 102(e), but falls short of
establishing a standard for litigator conduct.
The phrase "improper professional conduct" first appeared in the Rules of
Practice in 1938.70 However, the SEC was slow to explore its meaning. Prior to
1976, the SEC rarely used Rule 102(e) to sanction attorneys or other profession-
als. 71 Cases involving attorneys disciplined under Rule 102(e)'s "unethical or
improper professional conduct" clause were even rarer. In the few cases that did
65. Carter, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC Docket 292 (Feb. 28, 1981).
66. See infra Part l1.A (discussing the uncertain ethical standard for SEC litigators).
67. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1)(ii).
68. See infra Part IL.B (discussing the lack of mental state requirements in Rule 102(e) and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Rules).
69. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1)(ii) (2006). Rule 102(e)(1)(ii) also allows an attorney to be disciplined for
"lacking ... character or integrity." See id. However, no administrative actions appear to have been brought
based on the character and integrity requirements. Furthermore, no statements by SEC officials suggest that the
SEC intends to view the requirements of character or integrity as stand-alone grounds for disciplining attorneys.
For these reasons, although the character and integrity requirements are obviously vague, this Article does not
separately address them.
70. SEC Amended Rules of Practice, 3 Fed. Reg. 1584, 1584-89 (June 30, 1938). The 1938 Rule allowed the
Commission to disqualify an attorney from practice before the Commission if the attorney was "found not to
possess the requisite qualifications to represent others or to be lacking in character or integrity or to have
engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct." See id. at 1585. Prior to 1938, the Rule had allowed
suspension or disbarment if the attorney was "found by the Commission... to be lacking in character, integrity,
or proper professional conduct." SEC Rules of Practice as Amended 1936, 1 Fed. Reg. 1753, 1753 (Nov. 7,
1936). The release announcing the 1938 change does not explain the reason for the change. See SEC Amended
Rules of Practice, 3 Fed. Reg. at 1584-89.
71. Between September 1, 1936 and September 1, 1976, the Commission instituted only about 150
administrative proceedings under Rule 102(e). Pitt & Johnson, supra note 7, at 6 n.3 (citing Letter from the
American Bar Association's Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law to the Securities and Exchange
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arise, the Commission simply determined without much analysis that transac-
tional attorneys who helped companies submit false SEC filings engaged in
improper professional conduct.
72
In 1964, the SEC amended its rules to authorize SEC staff conducting
investigations "to report to the Commission any instances where.., counsel has
been guilty of dilatory, obstructionist or contumacious conduct during the course
of the investigation. ' 73 Following a referral, "the Commission will thereupon
take such further action as the circumstances may warrant, including suspension
or disbarment of counsel from further appearance or practice before it.",74 This
suggests that dilatory, obstructionist, or contumacious conduct violates Rule
102(e)'s prohibition on "unethical or improper professional conduct." It is,
however, possible that "unethical or improper professional conduct" should be
interpreted to include conduct that is not "dilatory, obstructionist or contuma-
cious." As a result, the 1964 amendments to the SEC's Rules of Practice provided
little additional guidance on the meaning of "unethical or improper professional
conduct."
2. UNCERTAIN CASE LAW
The Commission's first attempt to squarely address the meaning of "unethical
or improper professional conduct" did not occur until In re Carter75 in 1981.
Unfortunately, Carter, like the earlier amendments to the Rules of Practice, was
largely ineffective in defining "unethical or improper professional conduct."
Carter held that attorneys engage in improper professional practice if they fail to
follow "generally recognized norms of professional conduct. 76
In Carter, the SEC brought an administrative proceeding against attorneys
William R. Carter and Charles J. Johnson, Jr. seeking to suspend them from
Commission at (Jan. 26, 1987)) (commenting on a proposed amendment to SEC rules that would make Rule
102(e) proceedings open to the public).
72. See Schwebel, Securities Act Release No. 4304, Exchange Act Release No. 6424, 40 S.E.C. 347 (Nov.
17, 1960); Fleischmann, Unclassified Release No. 115, 37 S.E.C. 832 (June 6, 1950).
73. SEC Miscellaneous Amendments, 29 Fed. Reg. 3619, 3620 (Mar. 21, 1964). The referral rule now
provides: "The officer conducting the investigation may report to the Commission any instances where any
witness or counsel has been guilty of dilatory, obstructionist or contumacious conduct during the course of an
investigation or any other instance of violation of these rules." 17 C.FR. § 203.7(e) (2008). As previously
explained, the Commission has delegated the task of reviewing these complaints to the Office of the General
Counsel. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
74. SEC Miscellaneous Amendments, 29 Fed. Reg. at 3620-21. The rule now provides: "The Commission
will thereupon take such further action as the circumstances may warrant, including suspension or disbarment of
counsel from further appearance or practice before it, in accordance with [Rule 102(e)] of... the Commission's
rules of practice[], or exclusion from further participation in the particular investigation." 17 C.F.R. § 203.7(e)
(2008).
75. Carter, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC Docket 292 (Feb. 28, 1981).
76. Id. at 319.
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practice before the Commission.77 Mr. Carter and Mr. Johnson were transactional
attorneys who represented National Telephone Company.78 During the course of
their representation, they assisted their client in filing various forms and
disclosures with the SEC.7 9 They also advised their client about the need to file
additional disclosures concerning financial stresses on the company.8° After
National Telephone declared bankruptcy, the SEC investigated the adequacy of
the company's disclosures. 81 The SEC also investigated whether Mr. Carter and
Mr. Johnson knew of and did not reveal securities law violations to the proper
authorities.82
The ALJ conducted a hearing and found that Mr. Carter and Mr. Johnson
"failed to carry out their professional responsibilities with respect to appropriate
disclosure to all concerned, including stockholders, directors and the investing
public ... and thus knowingly engaged in unethical and improper professional
conduct."83 The attorneys appealed the decision to the Commission.84
On appeal, the accused attorneys argued that "the Commission ha[d] never
promulgated standards of professional conduct for lawyers and that the Commis-
sion's application in hindsight of new standards would be fundamentally
unfair."'85 However, the Commission held that it "perceive[d] no unfairness
whatsoever in holding those professionals who practice before us to generally
recognized norms of professional conduct, whether or not such norms had
previously been explicitly adopted or endorsed by the Commission. 86 For
example, the Commission stated that all attorneys could be held to the
"universally recognized requirement that a lawyer refrain from acting in an area
where he does not have an adequate level of preparation or care" as stated in the
American Bar Association ("ABA") Code of Professional Responsibility.87 Yet
the Commission concluded that Mr. Carter and Mr. Johnson had not breached any
"recognized norms."88 The Commission explained that, although some "local bar
ethics committees and disciplinary bodies" as well as the "ABA's Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards" had considered when an attorney must
disclose a client's securities law violations, "precise standards ha[d] not yet
77. Id. at 293.
78. Id. at 300-01.
79. See id. at 300-14.
80. See id at 305-06.
81. Id. at 300.
82. See id. at 300-14.
83. Id. at 319.
84. Id. at 293.
85. Id. at 319.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 319 n.64.
88. Id. at 319-20.
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emerged. '89 In other words, because there were no recognized norms with
respect to attorney disclosure, Mr. Carter and Mr. Johnson could not be
disciplined. 90 Yet the Commission held that future attorneys engaging in the same
conduct could be punished by the SEC, regardless of whether state attorney
ethical rules adopted a reporting requirement. 9a
Although Carter focused on transactional attorneys and the much debated
topic of whether transactional attorneys should be reluired to report client
wrongdoing, the opinion makes it clear that all attorneys practicing before the
Commission have a duty to follow "accepted norms of professional conduct.",
92
Unfortunately, the phrase "accepted norms of professional conduct" is not really
any clearer than the phrase "improper professional conduct." The Carter opinion
suggests that the ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility contains some
norms, but it states that the norms must be "generally recognized." 93 However,
Carter itself prospectively applied a reporting standard that had only been
adopted in a small number of states.94 After Carter, the ethical standards
applicable to SEC litigators were as murky as ever. It appeared that litigators
could potentially be held to state ethical rules, model ethical rules, and rules
created by the Commission in an ad hoc manner.
Perhaps realizing that Carter had not articulated a clear standard for attorney
conduct, the SEC requested public comment regarding the opinion's interpreta-
tion of the phrase "unethical or improper professional conduct." 95 The request for
comments stated that "[a]fter careful consideration of the[] comments, the
Commission [would] issue a further release summarizing and analyzing the
comments received,, 96 but the Commission never did.97
89. See id. at 320. The Commission noted that "similar issues [were then] under consideration by the ABA's
Commission of Evaluation of Professional Standards in connection with the review and proposed revision of the
ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility." Id.
90. See id.
91. See id. ("[W]e believe that respondents' conduct raises serious questions about the obligations of
securities lawyers, and the Commission is hereby giving notice of its interpretation of 'unethical or improper
professional conduct' as that term is used in Rule [102(e)].").
92. Id. at 320. Carter was not the first Commission opinion to cite a model code of professional
responsibility. See Kivitz, Securities Act Release No. 5163, 44 S.E.C. 600, 607-08 (June 29, 1971), rev'd,
Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (citing the American Bar Association's Canons of Professional
Ethics). Carter was, however, the first Commission opinion to attempt to articulate a standard of conduct for the
attorneys practicing before it. See Carter, 22 SEC Docket at 320.
93. Carter 22 SEC Docket at 319.
94. See id. 319-21.
95. See Request for Comments on Standard of Conduct Constituting Unethical or Improper Professional
Practice Before the Commission, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,233 (Oct. 1, 1981). The Commission's Carter opinion had
stated that the SEC would seek comments on whether the interpretation announced in Carter "should be
expanded or modified." See Carter, 22 SEC Docket at 320.
96. Request for Comments on Standard of Conduct Constituting Unethical or Improper Professional Practice
Before the Commission, 46 Fed. Reg. at 48,233.
97. See SEC Final Rule, Disciplinary Proceedings Involving Professionals Appearing or Practicing Before
the Commission, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,427-01, 26,431 n.31 (July 13, 1988) ("The Commission has not formally
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Instead, attorneys practicing before the Commission had to settle for informal
guidance from the staff. In 1982, the SEC's then-General Counsel Edward F.
Greene addressed the meaning of "improper professional conduct" in a speech to
the New York County Lawyers' Association. 98 He stated: "In those administra-
tive proceedings based upon violations of standards of ethical or professional
conduct, I believe that the Commission should use existing state law stan-
dards." 99 He further noted that a suspension or disbarment proceeding "may be
appropriate with respect to dilatory, obstructionist or contumacious conduct
during the course of an investigation."'0 Mr. Greene did not address what
standard should be applied in situations where the attorney ethical rules differed
among states. He also did not reveal whether the SEC would look to state court
interpretations of state ethical rules in evaluating attorney conduct.
Notwithstanding Mr. Greene's speech, in the wake of Carter, the SEC staff
was understandably gun-shy of attorney disciplinary proceedings based on the
"unethical or improper conduct" subsection of Rule 102(e). 101 Instead, the SEC
limited its disciplinary cases to those attorneys who had already been enjoined
from violating securities laws, 10 2 convicted of securities-related offenses,' ° 3 or
disbarred in other jurisdictions. l04
With this uncertain backdrop concerning Rule 102(e), Congress enacted
Sarbanes-Oxley, and the SEC promulgated the Sarbanes-Oxley Rules. 10 5 How-
ever, according to the Commission, the Sarbanes-Oxley Rules did "not attempt to
articulate a comprehensive set of standards regulating all aspects of the conduct
addressed the expansion or modification of the standard enunciated in Carter... and intends to take no further
action in that regard.").
98. See Greene, supra note 8.
99. See id. at 171.
100. Id. at 170 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 203.7(e)).
101. Mr. Greene largely avoided scrutiny over his interpretation of "unethical or improper professional
conduct" by adding that "the Commission [had] never brought a disciplinary proceeding against an attorney
based solely on a failure to meet ethical or professional standards" and indicating that he believed the
Commission should refrain from bringing such cases in the future. See id.
102. See, e.g., Studer, Exchange Act Release No. 43,532, Accounting & Auditing Enforcement Release No.
1342,73 SEC Docket 1683 (Nov. 8, 2000); Rodriguez, Exchange Act Release No. 37,682,62 SEC Docket 2311
(Sept. 16, 1996); Granai, Securities Act Release No. 6762, Exchange Act Release No. 25,511, 40 SEC Docket
680 (March 24, 1988); Schulman, Exchange Act Release No. 23,668, 36 SEC Docket 843 (Sept. 30, 1986);
Hecht, Securities Act Release No. 6490, Exchange Act Release No. 20,234, 28 SEC Docket 1174 (Sept. 27,
1983).
103. See, e.g., Fisher, Exchange Act Release No. 46,954, 79 SEC Docket 170 (Dec. 6, 2002) (imposing
discipline after attorney was convicted of conspiracy to commit securities fraud); Cruickshank, Exchange Act
Release No. 45,510, 77 SEC Docket 135 (Mar. 6, 2002) (imposing discipline after attorney was convicted of
cocaine distribution); Nearen, Exchange Act Release No. 40,505, 68 SEC Docket 227 (Sept. 30, 1998)
(imposing discipline after attorney was convicted of securities fraud, money laundering, and other offenses);
McGovern, Exchange Act Release No. 25,379,40 SEC Docket 380 (Feb. 22, 1988).
104. See, e.g., Hackman, Exchange Act Release No. 46,478, 78 SEC Docket 1210 (Sept. 10, 2002)
(imposing reciprocal discipline on an attorney previously disbarred in Nevada).
105. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
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of attorneys who appear and practice before the Commission. ' 10 6 Rather than
defining "unethical or improper professional conduct," the Sarbanes-Oxley Rules
adopted a handful of rules that are applicable only to attorneys who represent
issuers. 10 7 The Sarbanes-Oxley Rules create additional questions because they do
not apply to all litigation attorneys. If a litigation attorney who represents an
individual (and is therefore not covered by the Sarbanes-Oxley Rules)1 08 violates
the Sarbanes-Oxley Rules, has the attorney nevertheless engaged in "unethical or
improper professional conduct"?
While Sarbanes-Oxley and the Sarbanes-Oxley Rules did little to clarify the
ethical obligations of litigation attorneys, they piqued the SEC's interest in
investigating and disciplining litigation attorneys for "unethical or improper
professional conduct." Following Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC reiterated its position
that Rule 102(e) "enables the Commission to discipline professionals who have
engaged in improper professional conduct by failing to satisfy the rules,
regulations or standards to which they are already subject, including state ethical
rules governing attorney conduct." 109 The statement seems to suggest that there
are standards beyond state ethical rules, and perhaps even beyond the Sarbanes-
Oxley Rules, that bind attorneys practicing before the Commission. Again, the
SEC did not explain what these standards are. The SEC did, however, take a step
that it had been unwilling to take in the years immediately following Carter and
Mr. Greene's speech-it began to investigate litigation attorneys for "unethical or
improper professional conduct."' 0
A recent administrative action confirmed that the SEC will look to state ethical
106. See SEC Proposed Rules: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed.
Reg. 71,670, 71,673 (Dec. 2, 2002). The Sarbanes-Oxley Rules
supplement applicable standards of any jurisdiction where an attorney is admitted or practices and are
not intended to limit the ability of any jurisdiction to impose additional obligations on an attorney not
inconsistent with the application of this part. Where the standards of a state or other United States
jurisdiction where an attorney is admitted or practices conflict with this part, this part shall govern.
17 C.F.R. § 201.1 (emphasis added). It is not clear what is meant by "supplement." On the one hand, this
paragraph could be read to simply establish that local jurisdictions may enforce their own ethics rules for
attorneys within their jurisdiction who practice before the SEC. On the other hand, the SEC might well interpret
this paragraph as allowing attorneys who violate state ethical rules to be punished under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Rules. Commentary by the SEC at the time the Rules were adopted does not resolve this question. See
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6297 (Feb. 6, 2003).
107. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text. Even the adopted Sarbanes-Oxley Rules do little to alert
litigators to actions that might subject them to SEC discipline. For example, the Sarbanes Oxley Rules allow, but
do not require, a litigator representing an issuer to reveal confidential information in order to prevent a material
violation of securities law. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(i). Because this rule is permissive, rather than
mandatory, it is unlikely to lead to attorney discipline.
108. 17 C.FR. § 205.1.
109. SEC Proposed Rules: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg.
at 71,671 n.13. SEC Associate General Counsel Richard M. Humes has stated that "in bringing a Rule 102(e)
proceeding against a lawyer, there is nothing unfair about basing it on the disciplinary rules of the state where he
or she practices because he or she is already subject to those rules." Humes, SEC Speaks 2008, supra note 21.
110. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
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rules in determining whether litigator conduct is unethical or improper. Still, the
administrative action falls short of developing a clear standard for litigator
conduct. In early 2008, the SEC brought a Rule 102(e) proceeding against
litigation attorney Steven Altman for "unethical or improper professional
conduct." ' Mr. Altman represented a witness in a pending SEC investigation
regarding substantive securities law violations. 1 2 Mr. Altman's client was a
former employee of a company that was the target of the SEC's investigation.
During the investigation, Mr. Altman called the company's attorney and
attempted to negotiate a favorable severance package for his client.11 3 In return
for the favorable severance package, Mr. Altman promised that his client would
not cooperate with the SEC investigation and that his client would not remember
information about events relevant to the SEC investigation. 114 When the Division
of Enforcement staff learned of Mr. Altman's conduct, they referred the matter to
the Office of the General Counsel for investigation.'
1 5
After investigation, the Office of the General Counsel alleged that Mr.
Altman's conduct violated "the New York State Bar Association's Code of
Professional Responsibility's Disciplinary Rules, to which he was subject during
the relevant period." 116 Based on this, the Office of the General Counsel alleged
that Mr. Altman "engaged in improper professional conduct."'1 7 By its issuance
of the Order instituting the Rule 102(e) administrative proceeding, the Commis-
sion appeared to endorse the application of the New York standards.1 8
The ALJ hearing the case agreed that New York ethics rules applied. She
rejected Mr. Altman's argument that Rule 102(e)'s standards for attorney conduct
were vague 9 She reasoned that "attorneys are always on notice that their
conduct must be in accord with the ethical standards established by the state bar
to which they belong."
' 120
Yet nothing in Altman or elsewhere commits the SEC to relying solely on state
I 11. Altman, Exchange Act Release No. 57,240, 92 SEC Docket 1424 (Jan. 30, 2008). This was the first
order instituting proceedings under Rule 102(e)'s "unethical or improper professional conduct" provision since
the Carter case. See Humes, SEC Speaks 2008, supra note 21.
112. See Altman, Initial Decision Release No. 367, 2009 WL 88063, at *2-3 (Jan. 14, 2009).
113. See id. at *3 The company's attorney recorded five of the relevant telephone conversations. Id.
114. See id. at *4.
115. See id.
116. Altman, 92 SEC Docket 1424. The order states "Respondent's knowing conduct violates DR-1 -
102(A)(4) barring 'conduct involving dishonest, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation,' DR 1-102(A)(5) barring
'conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice' and/or DR 1-102(A)(7) barring 'any other conduct
that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness as a lawyer.... ' Id. The Office of the General Counsel applied
the New York Bar Association's ethical standards in the Altman case because Mr. Altman was "a member of the
New York Bar" and "a resident of New York." Id. It is not clear from the Order where the alleged improper
professional conduct took place, or whether Mr. Altman was subject to other state or local bar rles. Id.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. See Altman, 2009 WL 88063, at * 19.
120: Id.
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ethical rules. 121 At a panel discussion regarding ethical standards for securities
attorneys, Professor Roberta S. Karmel (herself a former SEC Commissioner)
asked SEC Associate General Counsel Richard M. Humes: "[D]oes the Commis-
sion itself interpret some state ethics rule, or does the Commission apply some
more general standard that is an interpretation of its own opinion about ethical
behavior" 122 Mr. Humes responded:
Well, to date, the Commission has not put out a release, and I'm not suggesting
that it is about to, that addresses how [Rule 102(e)] cases will be handled. What
we do have to go on is what the Commission did in [Altman], which is to enter
an [order instituting administrative proceedings] which is based on the
disciplinary rules of New York State which [Mr. Altman] is alleged to have
violated. 123
Mr. Humes's answer seems to leave open the possibility that in some cases, the
SEC will offer its own opinion about ethical behavior rather than rely on state
disciplinary rules. Simply put, attorneys have no way of predicting how the SEC
will interpret the phrase "unethical or improper professional conduct." By failing
to adopt a clear position, the SEC leaves itself open to choose from among the
potentially applicable rules.
The SEC may argue that its failure to define "unethical or improper
professional" conduct is not troubling because it only intends to investigate and
punish those acts that are clearly unethical or improper under any conceivable
standard. 124 Indeed, the alleged litigator conduct that the SEC reports it is
currently investigating-"subornation of perjury, .... alteration of documents,"
and "obstruction of justice"-is not only unquestionably unethical, but also
potentially criminal. 125 But nothing in the SEC rules limits it to investigating this
conduct. Indeed, the Carter case provides a ready instance where the SEC staff
investigated and brought disciplinary proceedings against attorneys for conduct
that was not universally recognized as unethical under either model rules or state
121. Even if the SEC were committed to relying solely on state ethical rules, problems could still arise in
circumstances where the attorney is a member of more than one state bar association. States have not all adopted
the same ethical rules. Compare DisTRiCr OF COLUMBIA RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDuCr R. 3.3(a)(1) (2007) (stating
that "a lawyer shall not knowingly... fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to
the tribunal by the lawyer, unless correction would require disclosure of information that is prohibited") with
MARYLAND LAWYERS' RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 3.3(a) (2007) (stating that "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly
... fall to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer"). In
situations where state ethical rules conflict, the SEC has given no indication of how it will decide which state's
rules to apply.
122. Roberta S. Karmel, Ethics Panel Discussion.at SEC Speaks (Feb. 9, 2008) (recording available from
Practising Law Institute).
123. Humes, SEC Speaks 2008, supra note 21.
124. See id.
125. See infra notes 319-324 and accompanying text.
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ethical rules.126 Uncertain rules leave attorneys wondering what conduct is
permissible and what conduct is unethical. 
127
B. UNCERTAIN MENTAL STATE REQUIREMENTS
Rule 102(e) not only fails to define the appropriate standard of conduct, it also
fails to provide the mental state necessary to impose discipline. In particular, it is
unclear whether an attorney can be punished for negligent conduct that is
unethical or improper. For example, is an attorney who negligently fails to
produce one insignificant, but responsive document in a large SEC document
production subject to investigation and discipline?
In the 1998 Checkosky v. SEC opinion, 128 the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia ("D.C. Circuit") held that the SEC "failed to
articulate an intelligible standard for 'improper professional conduct' under Rule
[102(e)].' 129 In Checkosky, two accountants certified that financial statements
complied with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") when, in
fact, the financial statements improperly deferred some expenses. 130 There was
no evidence that the accountants' mistake was intentional, and the accountants
argued they should not be punished for negligent or reckless conduct. Neverthe-
less, the Commission suspended both accountants for two years. 131 The
accountants then appealed to the D.C. Circuit. In a per curiam opinion, the D.C.
Circuit "remanded the case to the Commission for a more adequate explanation
of its interpretation of Rule [102(e)]."' 32 The Commission entered a new opinion
126. If the SEC is committed to punishing only those litigation attorneys who have violated criminal laws, it
would be preferable to allow the authorities responsible for enforcing criminal laws to conduct the initial
investigation. See infra Part V.C.2. In those instances, the SEC could impose discipline after the criminal
conviction.
127. Steven C. Krane, The Attorney Unshackled: SEC Rule 2(e) Violates Clients' Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel, 57 NoTRE DAME L. RaV. 50, 83 (1981) ("Because [Rule 102(e)] is ambiguous, subjective and
nebulous, it is virtually impossible for an attorney to discern the borderline between zealous advocacy and
conduct which [Rule 102(e)] proscribes." (footnote omitted)).
128. 139 F.3d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
129. Id. at 223.
130. Id. at 222-23.
131. Checkosky, Exchange Act Release No. 31,094, Accounting & Auditing Enforcement Act Release No.
412, 52 SEC Docket 1122 (Aug. 26, 1992). See also Checkosky, 139 F.3d at 223 (describing the Commission's
decision). An ALl had suspended the accountants for five years, but the Commission reduced the suspension to
two years. See id.
132. Checkosky v. SEC, 23 E3d 452,454 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Each of the three judges on the D.C.
Circuit panel wrote a separate opinion. Judge Laurence H. Silberman concluded that he could not "determine
from the [Commission's] order just what the Commission [was] using as its standard for improper professional
conduct." Id. Judge A. Raymond Randolph thought the Commission had applied a negligence standard but
decided the Commission had acted "arbitrarily and capriciously" in applying the negligence standard to the
accountants. Id. at 467. Finally, District Court Judge John W. Reynolds, sitting by designation, opined that the
Commission's decision was adequately explained and supported by the evidence. See id. at 493.
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affirming the two-year suspensions. 133 This time the Commission stated that Rule
102(e) "does not mandate a particular mental state and that negligent actions by a
professional may, under certain circumstances, constitute improper professional
conduct." 134 The Commission further explained that a negligent violation of
GAAP and Generally Accepted Auditing Standards ("GAAS") violates Rule
102(e) only when it "threatens the integrity of the Commission's processes in the
way that the activities of unqualified or unethical professionals do." 135 Again the
accountants appealed. 
136
The D.C. Circuit concluded that the Commission's second opinion "provide[d]
no clear mental state standard to govern Rule [102(e)].' 3 7 According to the
court, the Commission "manage[d] to embrace and reject standards of (1)
recklessness, (2) negligence and (3) strict liability. ' 138 Moreover, the court
reasoned that simply relying on GAAP and GAAS was insufficient because these
accounting standards do not contain a sufficient state of mind requirement. 139 The
court noted:
Accountants and attorneys practicing in the securities field will draw little
comfort from the knowledge that their missteps will escape sanction as long as
they do not "threaten the integrity of the Commission's processes." It is simply
impossible to know in advance what sorts of negligent errors will meet this
"standard." 140
The court concluded that "[t]here is no justification for the government depriving
citizens of the opportunity to practice their profession without revealing the
standard they have been found to violate." 141 The court remanded the case to the
Commission "with instructions to dismiss the charge against" the accountants. 142
Although Checkosky involved accountants, its holding that Rule 102(e) did not
establish a "clear and coherent" standard for professional conduct is equally
applicable to attorneys. At the time of the Checkosky opinion, Rule 102(e) treated
attorneys and accountants identically. 143 Furthermore, there is no reason to
133. Checkosky, Exchange Act Release No. 38,183, Accounting & Auditing Enforcement Act Release No.
871, 63 SEC Docket 1691, 1703 (Jan. 21, 1997).
134. Id. at 1700.
135. Id. at 1702 n.63 (quoting Carter, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC Docket 292, 298 (Feb. 28,
1981)).
136. See Checkosky, 139 F.3d at 221.
137. Id. at 225.
138. Id. at 233. The court further stated that "[niot only does the opinion on remand provide no clear mental
state standard to govern Rule [102(e)], it seems at times almost deliberately obscurantist on the question." Id. at
225.
139. See id. at 224-25.
140. Id. at 224.
141. Id. at 225-26.
142. Id. at 227.
143. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2006). The Checkosky opinion itself drew no distinction between attorneys and
accountants. See Checkosky, 139 F.3d at 224 (noting that "[aiccountants and attorneys ... will draw little
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believe that the norms governing attorney behavior (various state and local
ethical rules) could provide an adequate mental state requirement, while the
norms governing accountants (GAAP and GAAS) could not. The Checkosky
opinion noted that while some portions of the accounting standards supply a
mental state for violations, not all violations of GAAP or GAAS necessarily
require a culpable mental state. 144 Rules governing attorneys have a similar
structure. Some sections of state ethical rules address the requisite mental state
necessary to violate the standard, 145 while other sections do not.1 46 Thus,
Checkosky's holding should be read to apply to Rule 102(e)'s regulation of both
accountants and attorneys.
As a result of Checkosky, the SEC amended its Rules of Practice to include
mental state requirements for accountant discipline, but it did not create mental
comfort from the knowledge that their missteps will escape sanction as long as they do not 'threaten the integrity
of the Commission's processes"'). See also Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452,486 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Randolph, J.,
concurring) ("The federal securities laws do not make culpability turn on the nature of the professional.");
Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Exchange Act Release No. 15,982, 17 SEC Docket 1149, 1165 n.10 (July 2,
1979) (Williams, Chairman, concurring) (stating that "[n]either Rule [10]2(e), nor the courts' recognition of it,
has ever drawn a distinction between accountants and attorneys"). Cf. Peter C. Kostant, Paradigm Regained:
How Competition From Accounting Firms May Help Corporate Attorneys to Recapture the Ethical High
Ground, 20 PACE L. REv. 43, 61 n.89 (1999) (stating that "there is some evidence that different standards are
sometimes used for lawyers and accountants" but concluding that "the SEC generally holds attorneys and
accountants to the same ethical standards"). But see Potts, Exchange Act Release No. 29,126, 65 SEC Docket
1376, 1411 (Sept. 24, 1997) (Wallman, Comm'r, dissenting) (stating that it was "very troubling ... that the
Commission applies different standards for actions under Rule 102(e)(1) to accountants as compared to
attorneys"). To the extent that there is disagreement on this point, it only further underscores the lack of coherent
standards.
144. Checkosky, 139 F.3d at 225 n.5. The court explained:
Because one of GAAS's General Standards is that "[d]ue professional care is to be exercised in the
performance of the audit and the preparation of the report," Codification of Statements on Auditing
Standards, AU § 150.02 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub .Accountants 1993) (General Standard 3) (cited in
Checkosky [v. SEC], 23 F.3d [452] 486 n. 26 [(D.C. Cir. 1994)] (Randolph, J.)), any negligent audit
violates GAAS. But the converse - that all deviations from GAAS are per se negligent - might not be
true, nor is it self-evidently true with respect to GAAP.
Id.
145. See, e.g., MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.3(a) (2008); Wyo. RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R.
3.3(a) ("A lawyer shall not knowingly... make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fall to correct a
false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer ... ").
146. For example, many state ethical rules provide that "[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to
the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent[.]" MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.6(a); COLO. RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDuCT R. 1.6(a). This rule could be violated by an inadvertent disclosure of a
single unimportant privileged document or by an intentional disclosure of important material designed to harm
the client.
Because some sections of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not provide a clear mental state
requirement, most states have adopted the American Bar Associations' Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions. See ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANcroNs (1992); Rachna K. Dhanda, Note, When
Attorneys Become Convicted Felons: The Question of Discipline by the Bar, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 723,731 &
n.53 (1995) (noting that forty-seven states have adopted the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions).
These rules describe the mental state necessary for various types of sanctions. Unfortunately, the SEC has never
indicated that it would apply these standards when imposing attorney discipline.
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state requirements for attorney discipline. 147 Rule 102(e) now provides that
accountants can be punished for "[i]ntentional or knowing conduct, including
reckless conduct, that results in a violation of applicable professional stan-
dards."'14 8 Accountants can also be punished for "[a] single instance of highly
unreasonable conduct that results in a violation of applicable professional
standards in circumstances in which an accountant knows, or should know that
heightened scrutiny is Warranted" or "[riepeated instances of unreasonable
conduct, each resulting in a violation of applicable professional standards, that
indicate a lack of competence to practice before the Commission."' 149 While the
amendments to Rule 102(e) clarified the standards for imposing accountant
discipline,150 those amendments were "not meant to address the conduct of
lawyers, other professionals or experts who practice before the Commission.'' t51
The SEC did not explain why it chose not to address the mental state standard for
attorney conduct, 152 but regardless of the reason, attorneys were left without any
guidance.153
The SEC had another opportunity to clarify the standard of conduct for
attorneys when it adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley Rules. The first draft of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Rules stated:
With respect to attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission on
behalf of an issuer, "improper professional conduct".., includes:
147. See Amendment to Rule 102(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,164, 57,172
(Oct. 26, 1998) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)).
148. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1)(iv)(A) (2006).
149. Id. at § 201.102(e)(1)(iv)(B) (2006).
150. See Marrie v. SEC, 374 F3d 1196, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that the "lack of clarity" in the
standard for accountant discipline identified in the Checkosky opinion was remedied by the adoption of the 1998
amendments to Rule 102(e)). However, some have argued that the accountant discipline standards adopted in
1998 are still impermissibly vague. See Amendment to Rule 102(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 63
Fed. Reg. 57,164, 57,182-83 (Oct. 26, 1998) (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting) (arguing that the new accountant
rule was "convoluted and incomprehensible"); Leo Orenstein & Marc Dorfman, A Rule Gone Bad - SEC No
Longer Needs to Rely on Rule 102(e), But Can't Seem to Let Go, LEGAL TMEs, Nov. 20, 2000, at 36 ("One is
hard-pressed to disagree with Commissioner Norman Johnson's assessment, offered in his dissent from
adoption of the amendment, that this new standard is 'convoluted and incomprehensible,' representing a 'tour de
force' of ambiguity reminiscent of that condemned in Checkosky.").
151. Amendment to Rule 102(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,164 n.3.
152. In a dissenting statement issued when the SEC adopted the new rule for accountants, SEC
Commissioner Norman Johnson stated that the Commission's failure to address attorneys was "entirely
deliberate." See id. at 57,183 n. 166 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting). He explained that because the Commission
wanted to "leave its future options open regarding [attorney discipline under] Rule 102(e), the [accountant
amendments] intentionally" avoided adopting a mental state standard for attorneys. Id. at 57,183 n.166.
153. See SEC Proposed Rules: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed.
Reg. 71,670, 71,671 (Dec. 2, 2002) ("In 1998, in response to ... Checkosky v. SEC ... the Commission
amended Rule 102(e) to clarify the Commission's standard for determining when accountants engage in
'improper professional conduct'. The Commission did not at that time amend the rule to address how it would
apply the rule to misconduct by attorneys.").
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(1) Intentional or knowing conduct, including reckless conduct, that results in a
violation of any provision of this part; and
(2) Negligent conduct in the form of:
(i) A single instance of highly unreasonable conduct that results in a
violation of any provision of the part; or
(ii) Repeated instances of unreasonable conduct, each resulting in a
violation of a provision of the part.
154
The SEC explained that the draft rule "incorporate[d] the same state of mind
requirements that were adopted for accountants by the Commission in the 1998
amendment to Rule 102(e). 15 5 Unfortunately, this part of the draft rule was
discarded. 156 The SEC did not explain why it decided not to define the mental
state required to discipline attorneys for "unethical or improper professional
conduct."'
157
Now, more than a decade since the D.C. Circuit's Checkosky opinion, the SEC
still has not provided a clear mental standard to determine when an attorney is
subject to discipline for unethical or improper professional conduct under Rule
102(e). 158 In the absence of such a standard, the SEC's authority to discipline
attorneys for negligent or reckless conduct is questionable. Moreover, the fact
that the SEC has squandered two good opportunities to provide a mental standard
raises questions about whether the SEC is deliberately obscuring the standard.
154. See id. at 71,696.
155. See id. at 71,675.
156. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6314 (Feb.
6, 2003). Instead, the final Rules state that "[a] violation of this part... shall subject [the offending] attorney to
the civil penalties and remedies for a violation of the federal securities laws available to the Commission in an
action brought by the Commission thereunder." 17 C.ER. § 205.6(a) (2007). The Rules also state that "[a]n
administrative disciplinary proceeding initiated by the Commission for viplation of this part may result in an
attorney being censured, or being temporarily or permanently denied the privilege of appearing or practicing
before the Commission." Id. at § 205.6(b).
157. The SEC stated only that it "intends to proceed against individuals violating [the Sarbanes Oxley Rules]
as it would against other violators of the federal securities laws and, when appropriate, to initiate proceedings
under this rule seeking an appropriate disciplinary sanction." Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at 6314. Some have suggested that "objections concerning the inclusion of
a negligence standard" led the SEC to discard the more specific mental state provisions. HAROLD S.
BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WoLFF, GOING PUBLIC AND THE PUBLIC CORP § 24.28 (2007).
158. The SEC staff has informally sought to alleviate fear that the SEC will discipline attorneys for negligent
conduct, by suggesting that they are only seeking to punish attorneys who act with "scienter." See Thomas J.
Karr, SEC Acting General Counsel, Ethics Panel Discussion at SEC Speaks (Feb. 7, 2009) (recording available
from Practising Law Institute) (explaining that the SEC is generally looking for evidence of scienter when
.investigating attorneys for ethics violations); Monson, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,323, 93 SEC
Docket 1898, 1901 (June 30, 2008) (noting in dicta that the SEC has "refrained from bringing disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers under ... Rule 102(e) based on negligent legal advice"). These informal
assurances, however, do not bind the Commission.
396 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHIcs [Vol. 22:373
IV. INVESTIGATIONS HURT THE CLIENT
While the lack of clear standards under Rule 102(e) is troubling for attorneys
who may be investigated for unethical or improper professional conduct, the
manner in which the SEC is allowed to conduct its ethics investigations is much
more troubling for clients. When the SEC investigates litigators for unethical
behavior, it undercuts the adversary process and interferes with the attorney-
client relationship.
The SEC's process for investigating and punishing securities laws violators is
an adversary process.159 The SEC's Division of Enforcement diligently investi-
gates and seeks civil penalties for accused law breakers. 160 On the other side of
the table, those accused, with the assistance of counsel, defend themselves. The
client's attorney is an adversary to the SEC-not a gatekeeper tasked with
enforcing the law. 161 Through the adversary process, an impartial decision-maker
arrives at a just result. 
162
The SEC's investigation of litigation attorneys for "unethical or improper
professional conduct" threatens the adversary process by interfering with
safeguards designed to ensure that those accused are treated fairly.' 63 For
example, once the SEC decides to investigate an attorney, the attorney might be
forced to resign from representation, thereby potentially denying the client the
159. See In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 E3d 230, 235 (2nd Cir. 1993) (noting that the SEC "stood in an
adversarial position" to a company the SEC was investigating even though the company cooperated with the
investigation); Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. Civ.A. 18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *4 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13,
2002) (unpublished decision) (holding that "the SEC acts ... as a foe when it begins investigating a company
for potential violations of the Securities Act").
160. See SEC, About the Division of Enforcement, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/about.htm (last
visited Apr. 7, 2009) (describing the role of the Division).
161. Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. has defined "gatekeepers" as "independent professionals who are so
positioned that, if they withhold their consent, approval, or rating, the corporation may be unable to effect some
transaction or to maintain some desired status." Coffee, The Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note 12, at 1296. The
SEC has long recognized that while it may be proper to insist that transactional attorneys act as gatekeepers,
attorneys who act as advocates in an adversary process are not gatekeepers. See A.A. Sommer, Jr., SEC
Commissioner, The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, Address to the Banking, Corporation &
Business Law Section of the New York State Bar Association (Jan. 24, 1974), in LARRY D. SODERQUIST &
THERESA GABALDON, SECURITIES REGULATION 617-19 (4th ed. 1999) ("1 would suggest that in securities matters
(other than those where advocacy is clearly, proper) the attorney will have to function in a manner more akin to
that of auditor than to that of the attorney."). Others have argued that the SEC is mistaken because even
transactional attorneys act in an adversary role. See, e.g., Joseph C. Daley & Roberta S. Karmel, Attorneys'
Responsibilities: Adversaries at the Bar of the SEC, 24 EMORY L.J. 747, 765-67 (1975) (rejecting the idea that
"attorneys for corporate clients in the disclosure process or in considering exemptions serve in an advisory
capacity and have a responsibility to the public investor, and only in litigation do attorneys serve as adversary to
the SEC" (footnote omitted)). However, everyone agrees that attorneys who represent clients in active SEC
investigations are acting in an adversary role.
162. See Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Exchange Act Release No. 15,982, 17 SEC Docket 1149, 1162
(July 2, 1979) (Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting) (noting that "[vligorous advocacy of differing points of view aids
an agency in defining issues, understanding positions, and resolving problems").
163. See id. (arguing that "disciplinary action which curtails an attorney in his role as an adversary may
... impose a loss on the Commission in terms of the operation of its own processes").
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right to counsel of choice.' 64 In addition, during an ethics investigation, an
attorney might, without the client's consent, provide materials that would
otherwise be protected by the attorney-client privilege.1 65 In effect, the SEC
ethics investigation can divide the attorney from the client and make it easier for
the SEC to investigate the client.
The SEC's rules and practices are not designed to minimize the harm to clients
caused by attorney ethics investigations. As explained in Part H, attorney ethics
violations are investigated by the SEC's Office of the General Counsel while
substantive securities violations are investigated by the Division of Enforcement.
Yet nothing in the SEC's structure or rules prevents these two investigative
divisions from working together and sharing information. This leaves open the
possibility that the SEC might strategically decide to investigate an attorney for
ethics violations in order to gain leverage in the investigation regarding the
attorney's client.
A. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Those involved in formal SEC investigations have a limited right to counsel.
According to the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), "a party is entitled to
appear in person or by or with counsel or other duly qualified representative in an
agency proceeding." 166 In addition, witnesses testifying before the SEC in a
formal investigation or hearing have the right to be "accompanied, represented
and advised by counsel."1 67 The SEC rules further explain:
The right to be accompanied, represented and advised by counsel shall mean
the right of a person testifying to have an attorney present with him during any
formal investigative proceeding and to have this attorney (1) advise such
person before, during and after the conclusion of such examination, (2)
question such person briefly at the conclusion of the examination to clarify any
of the answers such person has given, and (3) make summary notes during such
examination solely for the use of such person. 1
68
164.. See infra Part IV.A.3.
165. See infra Part IV.B.
166. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (2000).
167. The APA states that "[a] person compelled to appear in person before an agency or representative
thereof is entitled to be accompanied, represented and advised by counsel[.]" Id. The SEC's own rule provides
that "[a]ny person compelled to appear, or who appears by request or permission of the Commission, in person
at a formal investigative proceeding may be accompanied, represented and advised by counsel .... " 17 C.F.R.
§ 203.7(b) (2007). See also United States v. Weiner, 578 F2d 757, 773 (9th Cir. 1978) ("It is firmly established
that a party compelled to appear before an investigation by the SEC has a right to retain counsel.").
168. 17 C.F.R. § 203.7(c). The SEC provides subpoenaed individuals with Form 1662 which states:
You have the right to be accompanied, represented and advised by counsel of your choice. Your
counsel may advise you before, during and after your testimony; question you briefly at the
conclusion of your testimony to clarify any of the answers you give during testimony; and make
2009]
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The SEC instructs unrepresented individuals who testify to "advise the
Commission employee taking your testimony whenever during your testimony
you desire to be accompanied, represented and advised by counsel. Your
testimony will be adjourned to afford you the opportunity to arrange to do So."
1 69
Similarly, individuals who are subpoenaed to provide documents are informed of
their right to have an attorney assist in responding to a subpoena. 170 Courts have
interpreted this statutory "right to counsel" to mean that the client has a right to
"counsel of one's choice." 171
In addition to the statutory right to counsel of one's choice, SEC adjudicative
proceedings must also comply with procedural due process requirements. 172 The
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution states that "[n]o person shall ... be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. ' 73 The Supreme
Court has explained that due process affords people "notice and opportunity to be
heard" before being denied liberty or property. 174 A proper hearing includes "the
right to the aid of counsel when desired and provided by the party asserting the
right." 175 The contours of the due process right to counsel in civil cases are not
summary notes during your testimony solely for your use. If you are accompanied by counsel, you
may consult privately.
SEC Form 1662, (last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
169. SEC Form 1662, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/secl662.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
170. The form accompanying an SEC document subpoena states: "May I have a lawyer help me respond to
the subpoena? Yes. You have the right to consult with and be represented by your own lawyer in this matter."
HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS & SECURITIES REGULATION
DATABASE Appendix US-22 (2007) available at Westlaw 1OD Int'l Cap. Markets & Sec. Reg. Appendix US-22.
See also Ernest F. Lidge III, Government Civil Investigations and the Ethical Ban on Communicating with
Represented Parties, 62 IND. L.J. 549, 616 (1992) ("When the SEC requests a person to supply information
voluntarily or serves the person with a subpoena, the agency informs individuals of their right to be represented
by an attorney.").
171. SEC v. Higashi, 359 F.2d 550, 553 (9th Cir. 1966) (citing Backer v. Comm'r, 275 F.2d 141, 144 (5th Cir.
1960)). See also SEC v. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7, 10-11 (D.D.C. 1976) (noting that the APA's right to counsel "has
been construed to imply the concomitant right to the lawyer of one's choice").
172. See, e.g., SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F3d 650, 659 (9th Cir. 2003) (requiring due process in an SEC
subpoena enforcement action); MFS Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 380 F.3d 611, 617-18 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that
decisions made by the Commission are constrained by due process). Indeed, the right to counsel of choice in the
APA was meant only to "restate[] existing law and practice that persons compelled to appear in person before an
agency or its representative must be accorded the right to be accompanied by counsel and to consult with or be
advised by such counsel." ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIvE PROCEDURE Acr 51 (1947).
173. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
174. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932).
175. Id. at 68-69 ("If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a
party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal
would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the constitutional sense."); Cooke v. U.S., 267
U.S. 517, 537 (1925) (noting that due process includes the opportunity to employ the "assistance of counsel");
Potashnick v. Port City Const. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1117-18 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Historically and in practice, the
right to a hearing has always included the right to the aid of counsel when desired and provided by the party
asserting the right."). Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (holding that due process required the right to
counsel in civil juvenile proceedings).
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well developed, 176 but depriving a respondent of the right to counsel of one's
choice in an adjudicative administrative proceeding raises due process con-
cerns. 177 Whether due process also requires access to counsel of choice during
the investigatory stage prior to a formal adjudicatory hearing is less clear. The
Supreme Court has held that full due process protections are not required during a
While the Fifth Amendment right to due process does apply in SEC cases, the Sixth Amendment's broader
right to counsel is applicable only in criminal cases. See Elliott v. SEC, 36 F.3d 86, 88 (1 1th Cir. 1994); Feeney
v. SEC, 564 F.2d 260, 262 (8th Cir. 1977); Nees v. SEC, 414 F.2d 211, 221 (9th Cir. 1969);Boruski v. SEC, 340
F.2d 991, 992 (2d Cir. 1965). But see Krane, supra note 127 (arguing that the Sixth Amendment's right to
counsel should apply in SEC administrative proceedings); Daley & Karmel, supra note 161, at 803 (1975)
(stating that "older precedents to the effect that the right to counsel is not constitutionally guaranteed in an
administrative investigation... should at least be questioned"). In contrast to the Due Process Clause, the Sixth
Amendment provides criminal defendants the right to effective counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). Under the Sixth Amendment, indigent defendants in criminal cases are
entitled to a court-appointed attorney. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963). This right to
government-provided counsel is not available in SEC proceedings. See Boruski, 340 F.2d at 992.
176. As the Fifth Circuit has explained:
There is a paucity of authority dealing withthe existence of a right to counsel in civil cases. This lack
of precedent is due in part to the historical development of the right to counsel in criminal cases. Prior
to 1836, the English system recognized the right of accused criminals to be represented by counsel in
the trial of less serious crimes, while denying the representation to alleged felons.
Potashnick, 609 F.2d at 1117-18. See also Michael P. Malloy, Economic Sanctions and Retention of Counsel, 9
ADMIN. L.J. Am. U. 515, 578 n.396 (1995) (recognizing that the right to counsel of choice in civil cases is
"underdeveloped"); Danielle Stampley, Comment, Blocking Access to Assets: Compromising Civil Rights to
Protect National Security or Unconstitutional Infringement on Due Process and the Right to Hire an Attorney,
57 AM. U. L. REV. 683, 699 (2008) ("Few cases directly address access to counsel in administrative hearings,
but many cases address the issue in criminal proceedings.").
Because there are few civil cases addressing the right to counsel of choice, courts and ALJs sometimes look to
criminal cases addressing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice. See, e.g., Potashnick, 608 F.2d at
1118 (citing Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976), a criminal counsel of choice case); Blizzard, Exchange
Act Release No. 45,806, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2032, 77 SEC Docket 1335, 1336 n. 10 (Apr. 24,
2002) (citing a discussion of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice in Wheat v. United States, 486
U.S. 153, 162 (1988)). Of course criminal cases are not a perfect analogy. On average the liberty or property
interests at risk may be greater in a criminal proceeding. See, e.g., Potashnick, 608 F.2d at 1118 ("A criminal
defendant faced with a potential loss of his personal liberty has much more at stake than a civil litigant asserting
or contesting a claim for damages, and for this reason the law affords greater protection to the criminal
defendant's rights."). But see Comment, The Concept of Punitive Legislation and the Sixth Amendment: A New
Look at Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 32 U. CfI. L. Rav. 290, 292 (1965) (noting that "some non-criminal
sanctions are as grave as some criminal sanctions"). In addition, the finality principle suggests that civil litigants
may be able to appeal their denial of counsel of choice earlier than could a criminal defendant. See Flanagan v.
United States, 465 U.S. 259, 264 (1984) (stating that the policy behind the final judgment rule "is at its strongest
in the field of criminal law"). Nevertheless, in some instances, criminal cases may provide useful guidance.
177. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970) (recognizing a due process right to counsel of choice in
a welfare benefits case); Am. Airways Charters Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 873-74 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding
that the Office of Foreign Asset Control could not prevent a corporation from retaining counsel); Mosley v. St.
Louis Sw. Ry. 634 F.2d 942, 945 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that "[t]he right to the advice and assistance of retained
counsel in civil litigation is implicit in the concept of due process.., and extends to administrative, as well as
courtroom, proceedings"); Great Lake Screw Corp. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 375, 378-80 (7th Cir. 1969) (holding
that due process required that a respondent who was denied to right to counsel of choice be given a new
hearing).
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purely investigative proceeding, 178 but the Court has not addressed whether some
due process rights, including the right to counsel of choice, still apply.'79
However, regardless of whether due process provides investigative witnesses a
right to counsel of choice, the APA does.180
Of course, the right to counsel of choice is not absolute.1 8 1 For example, a
client is not entitled to choose an attorney that is not admitted to the bar,1 82 an
attorney that he or she cannot afford, 183 or an attorney that engages in wrongful
conduct. 184 Nevertheless, due process concerns should not be ignored. Because
the SEC investigates both the client and the attorney, there are several different
ways SEC ethics investigations may deprive clients of their statutory and due
process right to counsel of choice.
1 85
1. LAWYER INTIMIDATION
First, SEC Division of Enforcement staff may deprive a client of counsel of
choice by threatening the client's attorney with disciplinary investigation under
178. The Supreme Court has explained:
'Due process' is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies
according to specific factual contexts. Thus, when governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding
determinations which directly affect the legal rights of individuals, it is imperative that those agencies
use the procedures which have traditionally been associated with the judicial process. On the other
hand, when governmental action does not partake of an adjudication, as for example, when a general
fact-finding investigation is being conducted, it is not necessary that the full panoply of judicial
procedures be used.
Hannah v. Larche, 36 U.S. 420, 442 (1960) (holding that witnesses compelled to testify in a non-adjudicatory
investigation were not entitled to learn of the allegations against them or learn the identity of the persons who
made complaints against them). See also SEC v. O'Brien, 467 U.S 735, 742 (1984) (holding that Fifth
Amendment due process rights were not implicated when the SEC refused to inform the target of an
investigation about subpoenas issued to third-party witnesses).
179. Some have suggested that no due process right exists during the investigative process. See Georator
Corp. v. EEOC, 592 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1979) ("When only investigative powers of an agency are utilized,
due process considerations do not attach."). However, this view is far from established. It may well be that some
limited due process rights, including the right to counsel of choice, attach during an administrative
investigation.
180. See supra notes 166-171 and accompanying text.
181. Cf. United States v. Amlani, 111 F.3d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that in the criminal context the
"right to select one's counsel may be limited in several important respects").
182. SEC v. Whitman, 613 F. Supp. 48, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
183. Cf. Amlani, 111 F.3d at 711 ("[A] defendant is not entitled to an attorney he or she cannot afford or who
for other reasons declines to represent the defendant.").
184. Cf. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173 (1986) (holding that "the right to counsel includes no right to
have a lawyer who will cooperate with planned perjury"); United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 627 (10th Cir.
1990) ("Courts ... must balance a defendant's constitutional right to retain counsel of his choice against the
need to maintain the highest standards of professional responsibility, the public's confidence in the integrity of
the judicial process and the orderly administration of justice .... ").
185. Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Exchange Act Release No. 15,982, 17 SEC Docket 1149, 1162 (July 2,
1979) (Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting) ("When a prosecutorial agency like the Commission disciplines attorneys
acting in a representative capacity, it necessarily impinges upon and interferes with a client's right to counsel.").
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Rule 102(e). 186 Part of the purpose of the right to counsel of choice is to preserve
the adversary system used in the SEC's administrative process.187 When an
agency action impermissibly restricts opposing counsel's ability to function in an
adversary role, it deprives the client of the right to counsel of choice. 188 In the
criminal context, courts have held that a defendant is deprived of the right to
counsel when the prosecutor creates an actual conflict of interest by threatening
the defense attorney with prosecution and the defense attorney responds with less
aggressive advocacy.t8 9
It is certainly possible that the threat of a Rule 102(e) investigation could
intimidate an attorney into less effective advocacy. In a very real sense,
suspending an attorney from practice before the SEC deprives the attorney of his
or her livelihood. According to one commentator, "[t]he expertise and compul-
sive due diligence required by the SEC virtually ensures a high degree of
specialization in the securities bar."' 90 The inability to appear before the
Commission effectively ends the ability of an attorney to practice as a securities
specialist.191 Even if the attorney is only investigated and ultimately not
186. See Simon M. Lorne & W. Hardy Callcott, Administrative Actions Against Lawyers Before the SEC, 50
Bus. LAW. 1293, 1302 (1995) ("[T]he threat of disciplinary actions before an SEC ALJ poses a particularly
disconcerting issue of intimidation when it is premised on the lawyer's performance in the practice of law. To
the extent that threat exists, the lawyer's client may in a meaningful sense be deprived of representation by
counsel.").
187. See Mosley v. St. Louis Sw. Ry., 634 F.2d 942, 945 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that the right to counsel of
one's choice "inheres in the very notion of an adversarial system of justice, and is indispensable to the effective
protection of individual rights"). Cf. Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 441(1985) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("A fundamental premise of the adversary system is that individuals have the right to retain the
attorney of their choice to represent their interests in judicial proceedings.").
188. Cf. SEC v. Whitman, 613 F. Supp. 48, 49 (D.D.C. 1985). In Whitman, the court held that the SEC
deprived clients of their right to counsel of choice when it prevented accountants who were assisting the
attorneys from attending witness interviews. The court reasoned that without the accounting expertise of the
accountants the attorneys were unable to properly defend the clients. Id. at 50.
189. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).
190. Krane, supra note 127, at 54 (arguing that the SEC's failure to set clear standards for discipline under
Rule 102(e) keeps attorneys without a high degree of specialization from practicing before the Commission).
See also David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 875 (1992) (stating that
"lawyers who do securities or banking work are likely to spend a majority of their time in these areas").
191. See J. WILLIAM HICKS, CIVIL LsAmLrrs: ENFORCEMENT & LITGATON UNDER THE 1933 ACr § 2.113
(2007) ("Although it is possible to imagine tasks that attorneys.., could perform that do not fit precisely into
the definition of 'practice,' it is clear that the sanction would significantly impair an ... attorney from
maintaining a... securities practice." (footnote omitted)); Richard D. Kahn, Note, Attorney Discipline by the
SEC: 2(e) or not 2(e)?, 17 NEw ENG. L. RaV. 1267, 1303 (1982) ("Because a securities attorney practices in such
a specialized area of the law, the inability to practice before the Commission is equivalent to the denial of the
right to practice law at all.").
The Commission, however, has suggested that suspension from practicing only securities law is not as
onerous as a complete suspension. See Fields, Securities Act Release No. 5404, 2 SEC Docket.3, 4-5 n.20 (June
18, 1973).
[T]he impact of an order by us under our Rule [1012(e) is not nearly so devastating as is that of the
order of a court barring a man from practicing law at all. The disciplinary sanctions that we impose on
lawyers can affect only their capacity to engage in our rather narrow type of practice. A lawyer barred
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sanctioned by the SEC, an investigation may hurt the attorney's practice. 19 2
Because the attorney's potential livelihood will be threatened by a disciplinary
investigation, it is easy to see how intimidation by the SEC may lead to less
zealous advocacy. 193 To the extent this occurs, the client is denied the right to
counsel of choice.
1 94
The SEC believes that the risk that SEC staff will use Rule 102(e) to intimidate
a client's attorney is not large because the Division of Enforcement staff who
from appearing before us is still free to hold himself out to the world as a lawyer, to practice before all
tribunals save this one, and to counsel clients with respect to the infinite variety of legal problems that
do-not impinge on the area affected by the federal securities statutes.
Id.
192. See Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate Fraud: Establishing a
Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. REv. 225, 239 (1996) ("The reputational paradigm in the legal profession is
... particularly sensitive to an allegation of improper professional conduct .... A securities practice that took
years to build can dissolve almost overnight as clients ... depart for one of many competitors who have
managed to avoid disciplinary actions .... ). Even SEC staff has acknowledged that an investigation hurts the
reputation of the attorney involved. See Humes, Remarks, supra note 43, at 346 ("[W]e are sensitive to the fact
that our inquiries can have a palpable affect on an attorney's professional reputation and livelihood. This
concern reminds me of the statement of the Christopher Plummer character in the movie Syriana, who said that
you are innocent until you are investigated."' (footnote omitted)).
This is not to suggest that an attorney cannot return to a successful practice after facing a Rule 102(e)
proceeding, but avoiding discipline. Indeed, after the conclusion of the Carter case, William R. Carter practiced
securities law for several more years at Brown, Wood, Ivey, Mitchell & Petty and served as a director of
Checkers Motor Corporation. See In Memoriam, HARv. L. BULL. (Spring 2007) available at http://www.law.
harvard.edu/news/bulletin/2007/spring/memoriam.php (last visited Apr. 7, 2009) (discussing Mr. Carter's
career). Charles J. Johnson also continued his practice and even co-authored a book on securities law. See
CHARLES J. JOHNSON, JR. & JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN, CORPORATE FINANCE AND SECuRrTIEs LAW XXi-xxxii (4th ed.
2007) (discussing Mr. Johnson's career). However, an SEC ethics investigation is undoubtedly damaging to an
attorney's practice.
193. See Greene, supra note 8, at 170 (noting that "the threat of institution of Rule [1012(e) proceedings in
situations where the lawyer appears as an advocate could have a serious chilling effect on zealous
representation"); Norman S. Johnson & Ross A. Albert, Ddjbi Vu All Over Again: The Securities and Exchange
Commission Once More Attempts to Regulate the Accounting Profession Through Rule 102(e) of its Rules of
Practice, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 553, 573-74 (1999) ("[T]he threat of disciplinary action might well intimidate and
interfere with the exercise of independent professional judgment .... "); Daley & Karmel, supra note 161, at
825 ("An attorney cannot adequately represent his clients when he is worried about his own liability."). But see
Greene, supra note 8, at 170 (arguing that because "lawyers' actions have always been restricted by rules of
ethics ... Commission disciplinary actions, which only enforce existing standards should have no chilling
effect beyond that already created by the existence of state and local disciplinary authorities").
194. See Lome & Callcott, supra note 186, at 1302. Some might argue that in this regard, Rule 102(e) poses
no greater threat to the SEC process than other SEC enforcement powers. After all, the SEC is free to investigate
attorneys for a myriad of securities law violations. See, e.g,, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2007). The SEC can bring cease-and-desist proceedings against attorneys. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3. It can also bring
actions seeking civil monetary penalties and injunctions against attorneys. Id. § 78u(d). Any of these actions
might have a chilling affect on the advocacy provided by the attorney. But the danger posed by Rule 102(e) is
unique. As explained in Part Im, Rule 102(e)'s "unethical or improper professional conduct" language, provides
no real standard for attorney conduct and does not clearly identify when an attorney may be punished. For this
reason, the SEC staff has much broader discretion to threaten investigation under Rule 102(e) than it does in
other contexts. In addition, Rule 102(e) investigations may be more likely to affect.the attorney's representation
because Rule 102(e) investigations focus on the attorney's conduct as an attorney. In contrast, other
investigations may not be directly related to the attorney's representation of the client.
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might threaten an investigation do not themselves have the power to conduct
Rule 102(e) investigations.195 Instead, Rule 102(e) investigations are conducted
by the SEC's Office of the General Counsel. 196 The implication is that the SEC's
authority to investigate under Rule 102(e) poses no more danger than states'
authority to investigate attorney ethics matters.
But simply creating the Office of the General Counsel to investigate ethics
complaints did not solve the problem. There is little true separation between the
Office of the General Counsel and the Division of Enforcement. There are no
rules or policies that prevent the Division of Enforcement and the Office of the
General Counsel from working together. The Office of the General Counsel is
free to provide the Division of Enforcement with the information collected
during the investigation. Moreover, both may be motivated by the mission of the
SEC to "protect investors."' 97 Indeed, anecdotal evidence of threats by Division
of Enforcement staff1 98 suggests that even some SEC attorneys believe that Rule
102(e) can be used as a tool to intimidate opposing counsel. If this intimidation
occurs, the client has been deprived of the right to counsel of choice.
The SEC's other measure that is intended to prevent overreaching by the SEC
staff is the rule that the Commission must issue a formal order of investigation
before the Office of the General Counsel may formally subpoena documents or
195. See Humes, Remarks, supra note 43, at 345 (noting that the Office of the General Counsel was assigned
the task of conducting attorney ethics investigations "to avoid even the perception" that the Division of
Enforcement was using the "responsibility to enforce ethical standards as a basis to obtain leverage against
lawyers in pursuing and settling its cases"); Humes, SEC Speaks 2007, supra note 19 ("Historically there has
been a concern, I think, particularly in the private bar that our Enforcement Division may use the possibility of
bringing a 102(e) proceeding as leverage to get a lawyer representing a client in an investigation to agree to
perhaps a better settlement .... [J]ust to assuage any concerns that the bar might have in that regard, the
General Counsel has retained responsibility for both investigating and bringing those cases.").
196. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
197. SEC, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and
Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Apr. 7, 2009). See also
Painter & Duggan, supra note 192, at 227 (noting that "the effect of enforcement proceedings against lawyers
may be secondary in the minds of agency officials bent on doing anything necessary to combat fraud").
In addition, the SEC's Office of the General Counsel is tasked with "representing the Commission, its
members, and its employees at the trial and appellate levels, when they are parties to civil or administrative
litigation arising from the performance of the Commission's official functions, such as enforcement
investigations and rulemaking proceedings." See SEC Office of the General Counsel, http://www.sec.gov/about/
offices/ogc.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2009). It is possible that the Office of the General Counsel's role as a
defender of SEC employees could lead to a bias against attorneys accused by those employees of wrongdoing.
198. DAVID M. BRODSKY, ETIcs IN CONTEXT 2005: LEGAL EXPOSURE OF INTERNAL COUNSEL POST-SARBANES-
OXLEY 137, 142 (PLI New York Practice Skills Handbook Series No. 154, 2005) WL 154 PLI/NY 137, 142
(summarizing portions of a November 19,2004 meeting of the ABA Business Law Section's Federal Regulation
of Securities Committee) (reporting that a defense attorney stated "that even lawyers' preparation of witnesses is
now under scrutiny by the [s]taff'); Krane, supra note 127, at 50-53, 81-84 (stating that the SEC has "been
known to actually intimidate attorneys, by threats of prosecution under [R]ule [1012(e) or otherwise").
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testimony.199 In addition, the Commission-not the staff--determines whether to
issue an Order for Proceedings. 2°
Unfortunately, the Commission does not serve as an effective check on the
staff's investigations. Under the current procedural rules, the SEC staff may
conduct *informal investigations of attorneys without authorization from the
Commission.20 1 During an informal investigation the staff can still request
documents and interview witnesses.2 °2 This activity may intimidate an attorney
into less zealous advocacy and thereby deprive the client the right to counsel of
choice.
2. SECRET INVESTIGATIONS
Even when an attorney has not been threatened by SEC staff, a client may still
be deprived of the right to counsel of choice. In some instances, the client and the
attorney might not immediately learn of the SEC's investigation of the client's
attorney.20 3 In these instances, the attorney could have already lost all credibility
with the Division of Enforcement, yet the staff might allow the attorney to
continue representing the client: Due to the staff's distrust, the client could be
denied an effective advocate. Particularly in situations where the attorney's
alleged wrongdoing does not implicate the client, such a result would impinge on
the client's rights.
A recent Rule 102(e) investigation of a litigator illustrates this problem. During
the mutual fund scandals of 2003,20 the SEC began to investigate Trautman
Wasserman & Company, Inc. ("Trautman Wasserman"), a registered broker-
dealer.20 5 Ultimately, the SEC's investigation focused on market timing and late
trading activities of a handful of Trautman Wasserman executives, including
Chief Financial Officer Mark Barbera. °6 During the investigation, Mr. Barbera
199. Prezioso, supra note 19 (noting the Commission's role in assuring that the SEC does not engage in
overzealous discipline of attorneys). For a discussion of the Commission's role in the Rule 102(e) process see
supra Part H.
200. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
202. See 17 C.F.R. § 200.21 (2007).
203. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (describing how the SEC may conduct informal and
formal investigations into attorney professional conduct without informing either the attorney or the client).
204. In September 2003, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer announced that his office had evidence of
"widespread" instances of late trading and market timing. Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer, State Investigation Reveals Mutual Fund Fraud (Sept. 3, 2003), available at http:/
www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/sepO3a03.htmil. Shortly thereafter, it became clear that the SEC was also
investigating a number of market-timing and late trading cases. See Floyd Norris, Pile of Pennies is Adding Up
to a Scandal in Mutual Funds, N.Y. TsS, Nov. 1, 2003, at C1.
205. See Peter Elkind & Doris Burke, Janus's Bad Timing: A Widening Market-Timing Scandal Taints a
Former Star Portfolio Manager, FORTUNE, Jan. 12, 2004, at 31.
206. See Trautman Wasserman & Co., Securities Act Release No. 8780, Exchange Act Release No. 55,238,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2589, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,696, 89 SEC Docket 2855
(Feb. 5, 2007) (order instituting administrative proceedings).
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and other Trautman Wasserman executives were represented by Leon B.
Borstein.2 7 According to the SEC, Mr. Borstein met with witnesses, whom he
did not represent, and pressured them to provide false testimony to the SEC that
would corroborate testimony of one of the other Trautman Wasserman execu-
tives.2°s Mr. Barbera was not involved in Mr. Borstein's alleged wrongful
conduct.20 9 When the Division of Enforcement interviewed the witnesses, the
witnesses testified that Mr. Borstein had pressured them to lie.2 l ° Suspecting that
Mr. Borstein had engaged in "unethical or improper professional conduct," the
Division of Enforcement requested that the Office of the General Counsel
investigate.21' However, neither the Division of Enforcement nor the Office of
the General Counsel informed Mr. Barbera that his attorney was under
investigation.212 Consequently, Mr. Borstein continued to represent Mr. Barbera.
Mr. Borstein produced documents on Mr. Barbera's behalf and met with the SEC
to discuss Mr. Barbera's Wells submission.213 About six months later, the Office
of the General Counsel contacted Mr. Borstein and asked that he "appear for an
interview pursuant to Rule of Practice 102(e). ' 2 14 Mr. Borstein then withdrew
from representing Mr. Barbera.215 Shortly thereafter, the SEC issued an Order
Instituting Proceedings against Mr. Barbera.216
Upset by the SEC's failure to timely inform him of the investigation of his
attorney, Mr. Barbera filed an interlocutory petition asking the Commission to
dismiss the proceeding against him.2 17 Mr. Barbera argued that "[o]nce Mr.
Borstein himself became a 'target,' ... Mr. Borstein [was] unable to function as
an effective advocate., 218 "The Division [of Enforcement] viewed Mr. Borstein
as untrustworthy [and, as a result, he] could not serve as an effective
advocate. 2 t9 Mr. Barbera asserted that once the SEC began its investigation of
207. See Trautman Wasserman & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 55,989, Investment Advisers Release No.
2613, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,880, 90 SEC Docket 2832, 2837 (June 29, 2007) (order denying
petition for interlocutory review).
208. Division of Enforcement's Memorandum Opposing Respondent Mark Barbera's Motion to Dismiss the
Administrative Proceedings Against Him at 7, Trautman Wasserman & Co., 90 SEC Docket 2832 (Admin.
Proc. File No. 3-12559) [hereinafter Enforcement Trautman Wasserman Brief].
209. See Respondent Mark Barbera's Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 8, Trautman
Wasserman & Co., 90 SEC Docket 2832 (Admin. Proc. File No. 3-12559) [hereinafter Barbera Reply Brief].
210. Trautman Wasserman & Co., 90 SEC Docket at 2835; Enforcement Trautman Wasserman Brief, supra
note 208, at 7-8; Barbera Reply Brief, supra note 209, at 7.
211. Trautman Wasserman & Co., 90 SEC Docket at 2835 & n. 16; Barbera Reply Brief, supra note 209, at 9.
212. Barbera Reply Brief, supra note 209, at 7. In fact, Mr. Barbera asserted that during the Wells process the
Division of Enforcement staff purposely made no mention of the witnesses that had implicated Mr. Borstein in
unethical conduct. Id.
213. Id. at9.
214. Trautman Wasserman & Co., 90 SEC Docket at 2835.
215. See id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2832, 2835.
218. Barbera Reply Brief, supra note 209, at 7.
219. Id. at 10.
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Mr. Borstein, the SEC had a duty to inform Mr. Barbera or Mr. Borstein of the
investigation.22 ° If such notification had been provided, Mr. Barbera could have
made an informed decision about whether to waive the conflict of interest that
arose with his attorney.22 However, without notice of the conflict, Mr. Barbera
believed he was deprived of counsel of his choosing. 2
The Commission declined to dismiss the charges against Mr. Barbera. 2 3 It
rejected Mr. Barbera's argument that he was denied counsel of choice because his
attorney was viewed by the SEC staff as "untrustworthy. '2 24 The Commission
explained that, even assuming the staff viewed Mr. Borstein as untrustworthy,
"[p]arties in adversarial proceedings may view with skepticism the position
asserted by opposing counsel. 2 25 Moreover, the Commission stated that once
Mr. Barbera retained new counsel, "any alleged harm he may have suffered
because of [Mr.] Borstein's alleged conflict" was cured.226
Mr. Barbera reached a settlement with the SEC shortly after the Commission's
decision.227 Consequently, no court has had the opportunity to address whether
the Commission's decision was correct. Undoubtedly the Commission is correct
in concluding that nothing in the Due Process Clause requires that Mr. Barbera be
represented by an attorney whom the Commission finds credible. On the other
hand, the SEC has been aggressive in stamping out potential conflicts of interest
that occur when an attorney represents more than one party in an investigation.22 8
Ostensibly, the SEC takes this position to ensure that each party receives
conflict-free representation from a zealous advocate. 29 Why then is the SEC not
220. Id. at 8-9.
221. Id. at 9.
222. Id. at 7-9.
223. See Trautman Wasserman & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 55,989, Investment Advisers Release No.
2613, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,880, 90 SEC Docket 2832, 2837 (June 29, 2007).
224. Id. at 2835-36.
225. Id. at 2836. The Commission suggested that the situation might be more troublesome if the SEC had
acted in bad faith. See id. However, the Commission held that Mr. Barbera had not proven that the SEC acted in
bad faith. See id. It explained that "courts must presume that ... government officials... conduct themselves in
good faith." Id.
226. Id. The Commission added that "[e]ven if [Mr.] Barbera had shown that he had been prejudiced by the
alleged conflict between [Mr.] Borstein and-himself, he had not demonstrated that the appropriate remedy for
that prejudice [wa]s complete dismissal of the case against him." Id.
227. Trautman Wasserman & Co., Securities Act Release No. 8894, Exchange Act Release No. 57,327,
Investment Company Act Release No. 28,152, 92 Docket 1690 (Feb. 14, 2008) (order making findings and
imposing remedial sanctions as to Mark Barbera).
228. See SEC v. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (overturning SEC's decision to disqualify an attorney
based on a conflict of interest); SEC v. Higashi, 359 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1966) (same); Blizzard, Exchange Act
Release No. 45,806, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2032, 77 SEC Docket 1335 (Apr. 24, 2002)
(disqualifying an attorney based on a potential conflict of interest).
229. See Blizzard, 77 SEC Docket at 1336. The Commission's Blizzard opinion noted that "an attorney
before any tribunal must advocate his client's position forcefully in order to advance the integrity of the
proceeding." Id. Forceful advocacy may be compromised when the attorney represents two clients with
conflicting positions. Id. The Commission then explained that the need for zealous advocacy was so important
[Vol. 22:373
SEC DISCIPLINE OF LITIGATION ATTORNEYS
always eager to disclose a potential conflict of which the attorney and client are
not aware? 230 It is easy to see how a client like Mr. Barbera may become
disillusioned about the fairness of the SEC process when he later learns that the
SEC has been secretly investigating his attorney. Due process may require that
the client be given enough information to make an informed decision regarding
his counsel of choice.2 3 1
3. FORCED RESIGNATION
Mr. Barbera's case illustrates another potential way that Rule 102(e) investiga-
tions of litigation attorneys can violate clients' right to counsel of choice. Once
Mr. Borstein learned the SEC was investigating him, he withdrew from
representing Mr. Barbera. 232 "Mr. Barbera then had no choice but to retain new
counsel, who did not have the benefit of and knowledge from being involved in
the investigation .... ,,233 Mr. Barbera's counsel of choice was Mr. Borstein. The
SEC's decision to investigate Mr. Borstein prevented Mr. Borstein from
representing Mr. Barbera.
Nevertheless, the Commission decided that any infringement on Mr. Barbera's
right to counsel of choice was not sufficient to justify dismissing the charges
against Mr. Barbera.234 The Commission noted that the right to counsel of choice
was "not ... absolute. 235 In this case, the Commission concluded that Mr.
Barbera's right to counsel of choice was "outweighed by the necessity of
ensuring that [the] administrative proceeding [wa]s conducted with a scrupulous
regard for the propriety and integrity of the process. 2 3 6
To support its position, the Commission relied on its questionable 2002
that an ALJ acted properly in disqualifying an attorney even when no actual conflict of interest had been proven.
Id. at 1336-37.
230. Those skeptical of the SEC's motives might note that preventing an attorney from representing multiple
clients reduces the likelihood that the attorney will help the clients collude with each other. Informing a client of
an SEC investigation into the client's attorney may yield no such benefit for SEC investigators.
231. Courts have suggested that, in some instances, the SEC has a duty to inform a defendant of potential
conflicts of interest. See United States v. Stringer, 521 F.3d 1190, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the SEC
had no duty to warn a defendant of a conflict arising when the defendant's attorney represented other defendants
where the defendant knew the attorney represented other defendants and the defendant had been warned about
the potential for conflicts); Csapo, 533 E2d at 11 ("The SEC properly fulfilled its duty by informing those who
came before it whether their lawyer had appeared on behalf of others and, if so, the possible conflicts which
might arise. The choice must then be made by the witness after a full and frank disclosure by his attorney of the
attendant risks.").
232. See Trautman Wasserman & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 55,989, Investment Advisers Release No.
2613, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,880, 90 SEC Docket 2932, 2836 n.28 (June 29, 2007).
233. Barbera Reply Brief, supra note 209, at 10.
234. Trautman Wasserman & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 55,989, Investment Advisers Release No.
2613, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,880, 90 SEC Docket 2832, 2835-36 (June 29, 2007).
235. Id. at 2835.
236. Id. at 2835 n.20 (citing Blizzard, Exchange Act Release No. 45,806, Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 2032, 77 SEC Docket 1335, 1337 (Apr. 24, 2002)).
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Blizzard decision. 37 In Blizzard, the SEC's Division of Enforcement sought to
disqualify an attorney from representing both the respondent and a witness in an
administrative proceeding. 238 The ALJ denied the Division's request and the
Division sought interlocutory review by the Commission. 23 9 The Commission
held that even though no "actual conflict ha[d] been established" and both clients
had consented to the representation, disqualification of the attorney was required
because "[e]ven the appearance of a lack of integrity could undermine the public
confidence in the administrative process. '240 This "appearance" of impropriety
standard gives the SEC significant discretion.
Courts never had the opportunity to review the Commission's Blizzard
decision because the ALJ later dismissed the charges against the respondent.
241
However, the "appearance of lack of integrity" -standard adopted by the Blizzard
opinion is plainly inconsistent with more rigorous standards established by
federal courts.242 For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that "before the SEC
may exclude an attorney from its proceedings, it must come forth ... with
'concrete evidence' that his presence would obstruct and impede its investiga-
tion. 2 4 3 If the SEC does not have concrete evidence, removal of the attorney
denies the client the right to counsel of choice. 2 "
Although the Commission in Mr. Barbera's case did not directly adopt the
Blizzard "appearance" standard, the Commission did not embrace a "concrete
evidence" standard either. In fact, the Commission never considered what
amount of evidence would be needed to ensure that Mr. Barbera was not denied
the right to counsel. 4 5 Taken together Mr. Barbera's case and the Blizzard
237. Id.
238. Blizzard, 77 SEC Docket at 1335.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1336-37.
241. See Blizzard, Exchange Act Release No. 49,899, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2253, 83 SEC
Docket 372, 378 n.23 (June 23, 2003) (affirming the ALJ's decision and explaining that no further discussion of
the respondent's right to counsel claim was warranted).
242. See MARC I. STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURrTIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT
§ 10.7 (2007) (questioning "the likelihood that the SEC's position [in Blizzard] ultimately will prevail in the
federal courts"); Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, Legal Alert - "Appearance" of Potential Conflict
Disqualifies Counsel From Representing Multiple Client In SEC Administrative Proceeding, Southerland Asbill
& Brennan LLP, May 3, 2002) http://www.sutherland.com/files/News/c93 10lcf-8775-4275-bd4c-b68ba823557c/
Presentation/NewsAttachmentb5935295-4b71-40e0-9e04-5de283084ba5/secrel2O32.pdf ("The 'appearance'
standard enunciated by the SEC for administrative proceedings in [Blizzard] seems to be in conflict with the
'concrete evidence' standard set forth in [other cases].").
243. SEC v. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (quoting SEC v. Higashi, 359 F.2d 550, 553 (9th Cir.
1966)). The Ninth Circuit's decision in Higashi, while similar, stopped short of setting a "concrete evidence"
standard. See Higashi, 359 F.2d at 553. Higashi, nevertheless, made it clear that the SEC does not have
unfettered discretion to disqualify attorneys. See id.
244. See Csapo, 533 F.2d at 11; Higashi, 359 F.2d at 553.
245. Although the Commission referred to witness testimony implicating Mr. Borstein, the Commission was
careful to "express no view as to the ultimate veracity of the testimony, or to its admissibility or probative value
in any proceeding." Trautman Wasserman & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 55,989, Investment Advisers
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opinion leave litigation attorneys wondering if there is any limit on the SEC's
discretion to effectively remove them from their clients' cases by instituting Rule
102(e) proceedings. This approach is plainly inconsistent with the right to
counsel guaranteed by the Due Process Clause, the APA, and SEC rules and
regulations.
B. ATrORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY BREACHED
In addition to the right to counsel of choice, clients also have the expectation
that any information shared with their attorneys will be held in confidence.
However, Rule 102(e) investigations of litigation attorneys can compromise this
confidentiality. When the SEC begins a Rule 102(e)investigation of an attorney,
the SEC collects documents, testimony, and other evidence relating to the
attorney's alleged wrongdoing. If the SEC investigates a litigation attorney for
ethical lapses during an SEC investigation of the attorney's client (or an
investigation for which the client is a witness), the SEC will likely seek
documents or testimony that ordinarily would be protected by the attorney-client
privilege. 246 The litigator may then disclose that privileged information, even if it
is not in the client's interest. This intrusion into the attorney-client relationship
compromises the fairness of the SEC's administrative process by giving the SEC
access to information that would otherwise be protected by the attorney-client
privilege. In addition, disclosure of privileged information in some Rule 102(e)
cases may discourage other clients from communicating with their attorneys.
This would compromise the fairness of the SEC administrative process on a
wider basis.
It is an elementary principle of law that attorney-client communications are
protected by the attorney-client privilege.24 7 It is equally elementary that an
Release No. 2613, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,880,90 SEC Docket 2832, 2835 (June 29,2007). It
is possible that the witness testimony could have satisfied the concrete evidence standard, but the Commission
simply never applied the standard.
Perhaps the Commission felt no need to address the appropriate standard because it concluded that, regardless
of the propriety of the Rule 102(e) investigation, Mr. Barbera had not shown that he had been harmed by the
change in attorneys. The Commission reasoned that Mr. Barbera's new counsel "had access to [Mr.] Borstein"
and had contacted Mr. Borstein to "gather information" that was used in preparing Mr. Barbera's defense.
Barbera Reply Brief, supra note 209, at 7. However, if the Commission was relying primarily on its conclusion
that Mr. Barbera had not suffered any harm, it seems odd that the Commission cited Blizzard or noted that the
right to counsel can be outweighed by threats to the integrity of the Commission process. Trautman Wasserman
& Co., 90 SEC Docket at 2835.
246. See Stephen J. Crimmins, New Legislation Will Require Attorneys to Report Evidence of Their
Corporate Clients' Violations, 34 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1340 (Aug. 12, 2002) ("[T]o the extent the SEC
takes on bar discipline [type] cases, there are particular problems that will arise in obtaining the evidence to
prosecute attorneys .... If the SEC attempts to subpoena the attorney's files, it may well be met by an
attorney-client privilege assertion.").
247. The attorney-client privilege applies if:
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attorney has an ethical obligation to maintain client confidences.148 The purpose
of the attorney-client privilege "is to encourage full and frank communication
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests
in the ... administration of justice." 249 Full and frank communication is
necessary because the U.S. system of justice relies on the expertise of attorneys.
The attorney-client privilege aids the attorney in gathering the information
necessary to give sound legal advice and encourages the client to seek legal
advice early and often. 250 Because the attorney-client privilege is intended to
benefit the client, ordinarily an attorney cannot invoke or waive the privilege
without the client's consent.25' If this were the rule applied to SEC efforts to
collect information in a Rule 102(e) investigation of a litigation attorney, there
would be no problem. The client could decide whether to allow the attorney to
disclose confidential information.
There is, however, an important exception to the attorney-client privilege: an
attorney is allowed to disclose privileged information over the objections of a
client in order for the attorney to defend himself or herself.25 2 This self-defense
exception typically arises when the attorney and client develop conflicting
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the
communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in
connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of
which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the
purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in
some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege
has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp. 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).
248. See MODEL RuLEs .OF PROF'L CoNDucr pmbl. 4 (2008) ("A lawyer should keep in confidence
information relating to representation of a client except so far as disclosure is required or permitted by the Rules
of Professional Conduct or other law."). According to the Supreme Court:
There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence than that of
attorney and client... ; few more anxiously guarded by the law, or governed by sterner principles of
morality and justice; and it is the duty of the court to administer them in a corresponding spirit, and to
be watchful and industrious, to see that confidence thus reposed shall not be used to the detriment or
prejudice of the rights of the party bestowing it.
Stockton v. Ford, 52 U.S. 232, 247 (1850).
249. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 387 (1981).
250. See id. at 387-91.
251. See, e.g., Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1967). Once a client
consents, an attorney is freed from the ethical obligation to maintain the confidence. See MODEL RuLES OF
PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.6(a) ("A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client
unless the client gives informed consent .... ); MICH. RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 1.6(c) ("A lawyer may
reveal. . . confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected, but only after full disclosure to
them..'..").
252. See SEC v. Forma, 117 F.R.D. 516,524 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("The self-defense doctrine permits an attorney
to disclose attorney-client communication in order to defend himself against accusations of wrongful
conduct.").
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interests, such as in fee disputes or malpractice cases.253 However, federal
courts254 have held that the self-defense exception is equally applicable when the
attorney is accused of wrongdoing by a third party, including the government.
55
These courts conclude that an attorney may reveal privileged information under
the self-defense exception regardless of whether the alleged wrongdoing is
criminal or civil in nature.256 Indeed, an attorney need not wait until being
formally charged; an attorney may reveal privileged information during a
government investigation, including the informal stage of a Rule 102(e)
investigation.257
An attorney who reveals confidential information under the self-defense
exception to the attorney-client privilege is also relieved of a professional
responsibility to keep the confidence. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
as adopted in nearly all states,258 allow an attorney to reveal confidential
253. See, e.g., Judwin Props., Inc. v. Griggs & Harrison, P.C., 981 S.W.2d 868, 870 (Tex. App. 1998)
(holding that the attorney-client privilege did not protect attorney-client communication related to a fee dispute
between a law firm and its client); Connell, Foley & Geiser, LLP v. Israel Travel Advisory Servc., Inc., 872 A.2d
1100, 1107 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (noting that "when a client sues for legal malpractice, the
[attorney-client] privilege is impliedly waived").
254. Federal courts, in cases based 'on federal question jurisdiction, apply federal common law when
deciding attorney-client privilege questions. See FED. R. EvlD. 501. The same federal common law is applied in
SEC administrative proceedings. See Weeks, Exchange Act Release No. 45,393, Accounting & Auditing
Enforcement Act Release No. 1504, 76 SEC Docket 2112, 2116 (Feb. 4, 2002) (interpreting the SEC Rules "as
permitting the invocation of common law privileges in a Commission administrative proceeding to the same
extent that Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence would permit the invocation of common law privileges in
federal district court").
255. See Apex Mut. Fund v. N-Group Sec., 841 F. Supp. 1423, 1430 (S.D. Tex. 1993) ("When a client
accuses an attorney of wrongdoing, the client himself waives the privilege by challenging the attorney's actions.
Although this reasoning does not apply when an attorney is sued by a third party, courts that have confronted
this situation have concluded that an attorney can waive the privilege to defend himself against third-party
accusations even though the client does not agree to waive the privilege."); In re Nat'l Mortgage Equity Corp.
Pool Certificates Secs. Litig., 120 F.R.D. 687, 690-92 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that an attorney accused of
securities fraud could reveal client confidences in defense of the third party action); First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 110 F.R.D. 557, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (denying a client's motion for a
protective order to prevent an attorney from revealing privileged material to support his own defense). See also
Rosen v. NLRB, 735 F.2d 564, 576 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating in dicta that "[w]hen a serious charge against an
attorney arises out of his or her representation of a client, courts have allowed attorneys to disclose confidential
information obtained from the client"); Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05CV1958-RMB(BLM), 2008
WL 638108 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008) (finding that attorneys could reveal privileged information over the client's
objections in order to defend themselves from accusations of wrongful conduct).
State courts have been unwilling to extend the self-defense exception to situations where the attorney is
accused of wrongdoing by someone other than the client. See, e.g., McDermott Will & Emery v. Superior Court,
99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 622, 626-27 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). This, however, is of little consequence because, as explained
in note 254 supra, privilege issues in SEC cases are decided by federal common law.
256. See First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 110 F.R.D. at 566.
257. See Forna, 117 F.R.D. at 524 ("Formal charges need not have been issued for the self-defense
exception to apply.").
258. Alexis Anderson et al., Professional Ethics in Interdisciplinary Collaborative: Zeal, Paternalism and
Mandated Reporting, 13 CLNcAL L. REv. 659, 694 n.91 (2007) (explaining that 47 states have adopted
confidentiality rules similar to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and 2 states have adopted
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information "to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the
[attorney] based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to
allegations in any proceeding concerning the [attorney's] representation of the
client., 259 Federal courts have relied on these ethical standards when ruling that
an attorney may disclose confidential information in self-defense.26°
Because of the self-defense exception, clients may be prejudiced through no
fault of their own. Even if the SEC does not allege that the client knew of,
assisted in, or benefited from the attorneys' alleged wrongdoing, the attorney may
choose to disclose confidential communications.261 Moreover, once an attorney
discloses information to the SEC's Office of the General Counsel, there is
nothing to prevent the Office of the General Counsel from sharing that
information with the Division of Enforcement. Indeed, there is nothing to keep
the Division of Enforcement from using information collected in a Rule 102(e)
confidentiality rules similar to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility). Only California requires that an
attorney "maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself... preserve the secrets, of
his or her client." See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 2004).
259. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDuCr R. 1.6(b)(2) (2008). See also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSEiL-
rrv DR 4-101(c)(4) (1983) (stating that a lawyer may reveal "[clonfidences or secrets necessary ... to defend
himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 64 (1998) ("A lawyer may use or disclose confidential client information when
and to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to defend the lawyer or the lawyer's associate or
agent against a charge or threatened charge by any person that the lawyer or such associate or agent acted
wrongfully in the course of representing a client."); Susan Martyn, In Defense of Client-Lawyer Confidentiality
•. And Its Exceptions.. . 81 NEB. L. REv. 1320, 1344 (2003) ("When a lawyer is accused of wrongdoing in
the course of representing a client, whether by a client, former client, or a third person, the law governing
lawyers commonly recognizes an exception for lawyer self defense.").
Even under California's more strict confidentiality rule (supra note 258) "case law and the official discussion
... suggest that the ethical duty of confidentiality may be excused to the extent necessary for a lawyer to defend
himself in litigation with a client or against accusations of misconduct made by a third party." Carole J. Buckner
& Robert K Sail, The Self-Defense Exception to the Ethical Duty of Confidentiality, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., July
2006, at 59, 61 (noting that California Evidence Code § 958 modifies the confidentiality rule by allowing
disclosure of "communication[s] relevant to an issue of breach, by the lawyer or by the client, of a duty arising
out of the lawyer-client relationship"). But see Los Angeles County Bar Assoc. Prof'l Responsibility & Ethics
Comm., Ethics Opinion No. 519: Whether There is a Self-Defense Exception to an Attorney's Duty to Protect
and Preserve Confidential Client Information in Order to Permit the Attorney to Defend Against Third Party
Claims (2007) reprinted in 30 Los ANGELES LAW. 76 (April 2007) ("Under current California law, an attorney
cannot, without his or her former or present client's consent, disclose the client's privileged communications
with the attorney or the client's confidential information, for the purpose of defending allegations brought
against the attorney by a third party.").
260. See Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190, 1194-95 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that
an attorney's disclosure of confidential client information to the SEC in order to prevent the attorney from being
charged with securities fraud did not violate applicable attorney ethics rules, including Disciplinary Rule
4.101); Qualcomm, 2008 WL 638108, at *3 (citing Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 in an opinion
allowing attorneys to disclose confidential information for self-defense purposes); In re Nat'l Mortgage Equity
Corp., 120 F.R.D. at 691-92 (relying on Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 in concluding that an
attorney could disclose confidential information in order to defend himself from a third party securities fraud
action).
261. Ifa client and attorney collaborate in wrongdoing, the attorney-client privilege can be overcome by the
crime-fraud exception. See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989).
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investigation against the client. If the SEC establishes a pattern of seeking
privileged information in Rule 102(e) investigations of litigation attorneys,
clients may respond by keeping information from their attorneys.262 This would
harm the SEC's investigatory process by making the attorneys less able and
effective advocates.263
The self-defense exception to the attorney-client privilege and the confidential-
ity rules leave the SEC with a powerful incentive to investigate-it may allow the
SEC access to privileged information that the client would not agree to
disclose. 264 To a certain extent, the self-defense exception encourages the SEC to
investigate all attorneys, litigators and non-litigators, for any potential violation
of law, rule, or ethical requirement.265 However, the incentive to investigate
litigation attorneys under Rule 102(e) is particularly strong, because these
investigations go directly to the attorney's conduct in representing a client
involved in a current SEC investigation. Rule 102(e) investigations of litigation
attorneys are more likely to turn up information that can be used against the
attorney's client. Furthermore, as explained in Part II, Rule 102(e)'s vague
262. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) ("As a practical matter, if the client knows that
damaging information could more readily be obtained from the attorney following disclosure than from himself
in the absence of disclosure, the client would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to
obtain fully informed legal advice."). But see David A. Green, Lawyers as "Tattletales": A Challenge to the
Broad Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information, 20 GA. ST.
U. L. REv. 617, 635-36 (2004) (arguing that there is "no support for the belief that, without confidentiality rules,
clients would be reluctant to share information with their attorneys"); Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal and
Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VuL. L. REV. 725, 815 (2004) (arguing that "[tihere is no
evidence that [the self-defense exception to the attorney-client privilege has] had undesirable effects on the
candor with which clients communicate to lawyers").
Of course, an attorney's disclosure of confidential information under the self-defense exception is
permissible, not mandatory. Because disclosure is not mandatory, a sophisticated client who is concerned about
potential future disclosures might attempt to obtain pre-emptive assurances from the attorney that the attorney
would not disclose confidences during a Rule 102(e) investigation. With such an arrangement, the client could
be candid with the attorney. Whether attorneys will agree to such an arrangement remains to be seen.
263. See Valerie Figueredo, Misadventures into Corporate Prosecutions After the Holder Thompson, and
McNulty Memoranda, 33 U. DAYTON L. REv. 1, 24 (2007) ("Inhibiting communications between an attorney
and a client hurts our justice system because it results in the loss of fully informed and vigorously adversarial
legal representation, thereby ensuring that attorneys will be unable to effectively counsel their clients to comply
with the law." (quotation marks and citation omitted)).
264. This would not be the SEC's first effort to erode the attorney-client privilege. The SEC's
Sarbanes-Oxley Rules drew criticism from some because the Rules, in some instances, require transactional
attorneys to disclose confidential information without the client's consent. See generally Todd John Canni,
Protecting the Perception of the Public Markets: At What Cost? The Effects of "Noisy Withdrawal" on the
Long-Standing Attorney-Corporate Client Relationship, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 371 (2004). In addition, the
SEC has drawn criticism for pressuring corporations to waive the attorney-client privilege. See Letter from
Karen J. Mathis, President, Am. Bar Ass'n, to Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC (Feb. 5, 2007), available at
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/attyclient/2007feb05_privwaivsec-l.pdf.
265. See Jennifer Cunningham, Note, Eliminating "Backdoor" Access to Client Confidences: Restricting the
Self-Defense Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 992, 1024-26 (1990) (noting the
danger that the SEC may circumvent.the attorney-client privilege in order to collect information about a client
by accusing an attorney of wrongdoing).
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standards give the SEC significant leeway to begin investigations. This combina-
tion of factors results in a situation where the SEC staff has an incentive to begin
Rule 102(e) investigations of litigators in order to gather information to use
against the litigator's client.
V. CHANGES TO THE SEC's ETHICAL POLICING OF LITIGATORS
As explained, Rule 102(e) investigations of litigation attorneys undermine the
fairness of the SEC's administrative process.2 66 There is no clear standard for
determining whether conduct constitutes "unethical or improper professional
conduct" or for evaluating whether the attorney's mental state at the time of the
violation warrants punishment.267 In addition, the process for conducting Rule
102(e) investigations leaves opportunities for SEC overreaching (or the appear-
ance of overreaching) 26 8 and prejudice to the client in nearly every possible
investigation scenario. If the SEC begins a secret investigation of a litigator, the
attorney's client will later justifiably complain that the SEC did not disclose a
serious conflict of interest.269 Yet if the SEC immediately discloses a Rule 102(e)
investigation, the attorney's client will complain that the investigation was used
to remove the attorney without sufficient evidence of misconduct.2 7 ° If the SEC
requests or subpoenas documents in the Rule 102(e) investigation, the client may
suspect that the SEC is investigating the attorney only to collect privileged
information that the client would not agree to disclose.2 7 ' Indeed, if the SEC even
raises the possibility that it may investigate a litigation attorney, some may
suspect that the SEC is trying to strong-arm the attorney into less aggressive
advocacy.
272
The question then becomes how best to remedy the deficiencies in Rule 102(e),
yet still ensure that SEC litigators act in an ethical manner while representing
clients before the SEC. This Part considers three possible approaches. It first
considers simply waiting for the judicial system to force action.2 73 While it is
possible that the judicial process would eventually be effective, it would
266. See supra Parts III and IV.
267. See supra Part ll.
268. The SEC denies that its staff would use Rule 102(e) as a tool to give it the upper hand in an investigation
into a client. Humes, Remarks, supra note 43, at 345 ("[T]hose of us at the Commission are confident that the
Division [of Enforcement] would not use any responsibility to enforce ethical standards as a basis to obtain
leverage against lawyers in pursuing and setting cases .... "); Krane, supra note 127, at 81 n. 197 ("[T]he
Commission has never, or virtually never, brought a Rule [102(e)] proceeding against a lawyer who appeared as
an advocate for a client under investigation or accused of past wrongdoing .... It is almost impossible to point
to an actual case that appears to have resulted from vindictiveness." (quoting former SEC Solicitor Paul
Gonson)).
269. See supra Part IV.A.2.
270. See supra Part IV.A.3.
271. See supra Part IV.B.
272. See supra Part IV.A. 1.
273. See infra Part V.A.
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unnecessarily delay needed changes.
This Part next considers what can be described as a legislative and regulatory
change approach.274 This approach takes the identified problems and seeks to fix
each of them by implementing narrow changes to existing statutes and
regulations. This approach leaves the authority to investigate litigation attorneys
with the SEC. While this approach has some appeal, I ultimately conclude the
SEC is not the best authority to investigate litigation attorney ethics.
I conclude Congress should adopt a statute to completely prevent the SEC
from investigating litigation attorneys for "unethical or improper professional
conduct. '275 Litigation attorneys' ethical lapses should be investigated by
existing state bar authorities, or, if appropriate, criminal authorities. Once an
attorney has been disciplined through one of these independent avenues, the SEC
could then impose reciprocal discipline.
A. JUDICIAL VINDICATION
Because the problems associated with Rule 102(e) implicate basic notions of
fairness that are recognized by the law, one approach is to wait for courts to
remedy damage done by Rule 102(e) investigations of litigation attorneys. We
could wait for the next Carter-like case for a court to instruct the SEC to adopt a
clear definition of "unethical or improper professional conduct." We could wait
for the next Checkosky-like case for a court to instruct the SEC to adopt a mental
state requirement for attorneys. We could wait for a client to convince a court that
his attorney was less zealous due to SEC threats of a Rule 102(e) investigation.
We could wait for a court to be squarely presented with the issue of whether the
SEC violates the right to counsel of choice by failing to disclose Rule 102(e)
investigations. We could even wait for a court to reaffirm Csapo's "concrete
evidence" standard for removing attorneys from a case.
Unfortunately, if the past cases are any indication, attorneys and clients alike
may lose confidence in the fairness of the SEC's process long before courts
address these issues. Historically there have been few cases that address Rule
102(e). In spite of the fact that Rule 102(e) has been in existence since the
1930s,2 76 Carter was not decided until 1983, and there as been little effort to
define the term "unethical or improper professional conduct" since then. 277
Similarly, the question of the mental state required for punishment was not
addressed until Checkosky in 1998,-and there has been no judicial attention given
to the mental state requirements for attorneys since. 78 This dearth of case law is
274. See infra Part V.B.
275. See infra Part V.C.
276. See supra note 70.
277. See supra Part Ill.A.2.
278. See supra Part 1II.B.
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unsurprising. Attorneys faced with discipline under Rule 102(e) may often prefer
to settle ethics charges quickly rather that suffer the harm to their professional
reputations that come with lengthy court battles.
Clients who are hurt by SEC ethics investigations may be more likely than
their attorneys to challenge the fairness of the SEC's process.279 Unfortunately,
few of these cases are likely to gain traction. Clients may have difficulty proving
that they were harmed by investigations of their attorneys.28 ° In addition, clients
may have difficulty judicially protecting privileged information because the
self-defense exception, which allows attorneys to disclose material to protect
themselves, is relatively well-established.281
Rather than wait for courts to force action, Congress or the SEC should take
affirmative steps to prevent unfairness caused when SEC investigates litigators
for "unethical or improper professional conduct."
B. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY CHANGES TO SEC INVESTIGATIONS
Simply deciding that Congress and the SEC should take affirmative steps in
order to ameliorate the harm caused by SEC investigations of litigation attorneys
under Rule 102(e) does not determine what steps are necessary. Informal
guidance and unwritten SEC policy are not binding and subject to change at any
time. Consequently, statutory and regulatory changes are necessary to ensure that
the SEC investigative process is fair.
But what. new rules and statutes would be best? One approach is to take the list
of identified problems with Rule 102(e) investigations and remedy them through
changes to regulations or statutes. For example, new statutes and regulations
should:
- Establish a clear definition of the term "unethical or improper professional
conduct."
- Establish clear mental state requirements for attorney punishment under Rule
102(e).
- Require that after an initial ethics complaint is received, the Office of the
General Counsel must investigate it independently.
- Require that clients be informed of Rule 102(e) investigations of their
attorney (even in the preliminary stage) so that they can make informed
decisions about counsel.
279. See, e.g., Trautman Wasserman & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 55,989, Investment Advisers Release
No 2613, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,880, 90 SEC Docket 2832 (June 29, 2007).
280. In criminal cases, clients have had difficulty establishing that they were deprived of the right to counsel
because they were unable to show that their attorneys engaged in less effective advocacy as a result of the
prosecution's intimidation. See, e.g., United States v. Roth, 86 F.2d 1382 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Aiello,
681 F. Supp. 1019, 1026 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). In addition, Mr. Barbera's case illustrates that courts are not inclined
to believe that a client is harmed when one attorney is replaced by another. See supra Part IV.A.3.
281. See supra Part IV.B.
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" Establish that attorneys may not be removed from cases for ethical violations
without concrete evidence that a violation occurred.
* Prohibit the Office of the General Counsel from sharing information
collected during a Rule 102(e) investigation with Division of Enforcement
staff.
If all of these changes were implemented, they would transform the Office of
the General Counsel into an independent investigator of attorney conduct with a
clear set of standards to apply. This would be a large improvement from the
current system. Attorneys would know the terms under which they could be
disciplined. The Division of Enforcement would have less opportunity and
incentive to overreach. Clients would be fully informed and would not have
otherwise privileged material used against them.
The weakness of this approach is that it still leaves the task of investigating
ethical complaints about SEC litigators within the purview of the SEC itself. The
SEC does not have a lengthy history of investigating this type of conduct.
Historically, the SEC has focused on investigating and disciplining transactional
attorneys.282 Moreover, even with statutes and regulations that require the Office
of the General Counsel to act independently, opposing lawyers and clients might
still be skeptical of the separation. After all, the Office of the General Counsel
would still be an office within the SEC. If attorneys remain skeptical of the ethics
investigator's independence, they might still respond to threats from the Division
of Enforcement with less zealous advocacy. If clients are not convinced that their
privileged information will be protected, they might not share confidential
information with their attorneys. Although these complaints may seem minor
when compared with the problems in the current Rule 102(e), they justify
considering a solution that moves the power to investigate litigator ethical lapses
outside of the SEC.
C. NO SEC ETHICS INVESTIGATIONS OF LITIGATORS
The next possible approach is for Congress to eliminate altogether the SEC's
Rule 102(e) authority to investigate litigation attorneys for alleged ethical
lapses.283 Instead, the SEC would refer ethics complaints about litigators to state
282. See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
283. Under this approach, the SEC would retain its ability to investigate litigators for substantive securities
law violations, such as insider trading or securities fraud. Unlike ethics investigations, substantive securities law
violations fall squarely within the mission of the SEC. In addition, investigations for substantive securities law
violations provide less of an opportunity for overreaching than Rule 102(e). See supra note 194.
In addition, SEC ALJs and the Commission itself (as opposed to SEC staff) would retain their authority to
discipline SEC litigators for ethical violations that occur in their presence. ALJs and the Commission must
retain this power of contempt in order to "preserve order in [the tribunal] for the proper conduct of business."
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517,534 (1925). See also Arthur Best, Shortcomings ofAdministrative Agency
Lawyer Discipline, 31 EMORY L.J. 535, 536 n.3 (1982) ("[Tlhe needs of administrative law judges ... for
2009] 417
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attorney disciplinary authorities284 or criminal authorities.2 85 After an attorney is
disciplined or sanctioned by an independent investigator, the SEC would be free
to impose reciprocal discipline.286 This approach recognizes that many of the
current problems associated with Rule 102(e) investigations of litigators occur
because the same agency, investigates both the attorney and the client. This
approach would decisively eliminate that problem. However, whether this
approach is preferable to the statutory and regulatory change approach discussed
in Part V.B depends on whether state disciplinary systems and criminal
authorities will be at least as effective as the SEC in investigating legitimate
complaints of ethical violations. I believe that state disciplinary authorities and
criminal authorities would be at least as effective.
1. STATE ArroRNEY DISCIPLINARY SYSTEMS
State attorney disciplinary Systems are an established avenue for investigating
and punishing attorney misconduct.287 Every state has well developed rules
regulating litigator conduct.288 Because the SEC's rules governing litigator
conduct rely largely on state ethical rules,28 9 the question is not whether the state
ethical rules are sufficiently rigorous. Instead, the question "is whether the bar's
enforced standards of competence and integrity are sufficient to protect against
lawyer abuse of those components of the public interest embodied in the federal
securities laws. ' 290 The answer is yes.
State bar associations and lawyer disciplinary agencies are tasked with
investigating and prosecuting rule violations. 29' All states have professional staff
dedicated to investigating and prosecuting attorneys for ethical violations.292
coercive power to maintain order may be as great as the needs of conventional judges[.]"). Moreover, this
contempt authority does not pose the same problems as Rule 102(e) investigations because the independence of
the ALJs and the Commission is firmly established. They cannot participate in an investigation in any way. See 5
U.S.C. § 554(d); Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
284. See infra note 305 and accompanying text (describing the SEC's authority to make referrals to state
disciplinary agencies).
285. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(d) (allowing the SEC to transmit information concerning potential criminal
violations to the Attorney General).
286. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(2) (2006) (allowing reciprocal discipline).
287. See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TE LAW GOvERNING LAWYERS § 1 cmt. b (2008).
288. See id. § 5 cmt. 5 ("Today, every state has adopted a lawyer code defining sanctionable offenses, and in
general discipline is administered only for a violation so defined.").
289. See supra Part IL.A.2.
290. Harold M. Williams, Professionalism and the Corporate Bar, 36 Bus. LAw. 159, 164 (1980).
291. See Mary M. Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the United States, 7 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETmcs 911, 933-34 (1994); Am. Bar Ass'n, Directory of Lawyer Disciplinary Agencies,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/regulation/directory.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
292. AM. BAR Ass'N CENTER FOR PROF'L RESPONSIEITY, SURVEY ON LAWYER DIscIPLINE SYsTEMs, Chart
VIII (2006), http://www.abanet.orglcpr/disciplinelsold/06-ch8.pdf [hereinafter SURVEY ON LAWYER Disci-
PLINE].
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These professionals see a wide variety of attorney discipline cases293 and, in most
cases, specialize in attorney ethical cases.2 94 Because state disciplinary officials
have a breadth of experience and expertise, they are able to impose sanctions in a
more consistent manner than SEC officials.29 5 Moreover, in every state, the
state's highest court ultimately determines whether the attorney has acted
improperly and evaluates whether the imposed sanction is appropriate. 296 This
adds yet another safeguard to ensure that accused attorneys are disciplined in a
fair and consistent manner. In contrast, the SEC has struggled to articulate a
standard for litigator conduct and has a string of Rule 102(e) proceedings that are
far from consistent.297
Nevertheless, some have argued that the SEC's expertise in securities law
gives it the edge in disciplining securities attorneys.298 After all, state disciplinary
professionals may not regularly deal with securities issues. While it is certainly
true that the SEC staff has expertise in securities law, this expertise is largely
irrelevant in most litigator discipline cases. 299 According to SEC Assistant
General Counsel Richard Humes, the SEC is currently investigating complaints
that litigation attorneys have destroyed documents, suborned perjury, and
obstructed investigations. 300 These are the types of cases that state disciplinary
authorities handle regularly. 30 1 In most cases, it will not take an expert in
securities law to determine whether a litigator has destroyed documents,
293. Patricia W. Hatamyer & Kevin M. Simmons, Are Women More Ethical Lawyers? An Empirical Study,
31 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 785, 810 (2004) (analyzing the various offenses leading to attorney discipline in 2000).
294. Only South Dakota and Wyoming lack a full time professional that is dedicated solely to attorney
disciplinary matters. See SURVEY ON LAWYER DIscIPLINE, supra note 292, Chart VyI. See also Judith Kilpatrick,
Regulating the Litigation Immunity: New Power and a Breath of Fresh Air for the Attorney Discipline System,
24 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1069, 1104 (1992) (noting that attorney discipline prosecutions are a specialized practice area).
295. Krane, supra note 127, at 89 ("State bar associations have more experience with disciplinary
proceedings than does the SEC, and as such are more likely to adjudicate the rights of the attorney in accord
with commonly accepted standards of professional conduct."); Lorne & Callcott, supra note 186, at 1301
(noting that the SEC has no "[sipecial expertise in determining or applying [attorney ethical] standards").
296. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr pmbl. 10 (2008) (stating that "ultimate authority" over attorney
discipline "is vested largely in the courts"). Many states have appointed disciplinary councils, often composed
of attorneys, who make the initial determination of rules violations and the appropriate sanction. See Leslie C.
Levin, The Emperor's Clothes and Other Tales About the Standardsfor Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions,
48 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 10 nn. 41-42 (1998). Sanctioned attorneys can then appeal their punishment in state courts.
See id.
297. See supra Part Ill.
298. See Cramton et al., supra note 262, at 796-97 ("Lawyers with considerable expertise in securities law
would be required to prosecute disciplinary violations involving lawyer conduct in connection with complex
corporate fraud situations, and such lawyers are lacking in bar counsel offices.").
299. See Best, supra note 283, at 569 ("When agencies regulate conduct that occurs outside of formal
hearings one of their primary justifications for exercising that power must be that they have expertise which is
useful to the discipline process. Such specialized knowledge may not be relevant, however, if the alleged
misconduct involves standard, simple offenses.").
300. Humes, SEC Speaks 2007, supra note 19.
301. See, e.g., In re Murray, 362 N.E.2d 128 (Ind. 1977) (disbarring an attorney found to have suborned
perjury); In re Williams, 23 N.W.2d 4 (Minn. 1946) (disbarring an attorney who advised a client to destroy
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suborned perjury, obstructed the SEC's investigation, or otherwise engaged in
unethical conduct.3 °2 State bar disciplinary authorities have sufficient expertise
to handle these cases.
Still, some scholars have argued that SEC regulation of attorneys is useful
because the SEC is better positioned than the state bars to uncover unethical
conduct that occurs during the course of an SEC investigation.303 It is true that
the SEC staff may be better positioned to view unethical conduct, but this does
not mean it is best positioned to prosecute and punish the conduct. State
disciplinary authorities do not generally witness unethical conduct. They
typically begin investigations of attorneys only after receiving complaints from
clients, opposing counsel, judges, or others.3 4 Indeed, the SEC staff can make
complaints to the state disciplinary authorities.3 °5 Because the disciplinary
agency is not a witness to the complaint and is not aligned with either party, it can
act as aft independent party in evaluating the merits of the complaint. If the
complaint is unfounded, the disciplinary agency need not investigate or prosecute
it further. In contrast, when the SEC staff is responsible for both observing the
conduct and deciding whether the conduct should be investigated and prosecuted,
there is no meaningful independent evaluation of the merits of the complaint.30 6
Although state disciplinary agencies are independent, some have argued that
we cannot rely on them to police ethics in securities cases because they lack the
financial resources to investigate and discipline attorneys practicing at large law
firms.30 7 Several commentators have noticed that state disciplinary authorities
relevant documents); In re Glass, 59 A.D.2d 248 (N.Y App. Div. 1977) (disbarring an attorney who was
previously convicted of obstructing justice).
302. While Professor Cramton and his colleagues argued that the SEC's securities expertise is necessary to
effectively discipline attorneys practicing before the SEC, their analysis focused largely on the conduct of
transactional attorneys. See Cramton et al., supra note 262, at 796-97. Because transactional attorneys have
been only rarely disciplined by state disciplinary agencies, it is possible to conclude that transactional attorneys
should be investigated by the SEC, but litigation attorneys should not.
303. See Wilkins, supra note 190, at 836 ("Simply as a result of their participation in an ongoing process,
[SEC] officials are likely to uncover information about lawyers' misconduct that would escape the attention of
disciplinary officials.").
304. See Hatamyer & Simmons, supra note 293, at 831.
305. THoMAs LEE HAZEN, 2 LAW OF SEcuRITs REGULATON § 9.8[3] (5th ed. 2006) (citing SEC Rule of
Practice 30-14, Exchange Act Release No. 37,894 (Oct. 30, 1996)). Professor Hazen notes that the authority was
further delegated to the Ethics Counsel. See id. n.5 1 (citing Delegation of Authority to the General Counsel,
SEC News Digest 96-213, 1996 WL 663696).
306. See supra notes 195-202 and accompanying text (discussing steps the SEC has taken to prevent
overzealous investigations of attorneys and explaining why they fall short).
307. See Cramton et al., supra note 262, at 796-97. Professor Cramton and his colleagues argue that:
Bar counsel's offices do not usually pay enough to attract and keep lawyers with securities expertise,
and lawyers are unwilling to support the increases in bar dues that would finance higher pay and larger
staffs. Moreover, unlike the SEC, which also needs more funds to attract and retain top-notch
securities lawyers, bar counsel employment does not offer as promising a route to a prestigious career
in private practice following government service. Lawyers with considerable expertise in securities
law would be required to prosecute disciplinary violations involving lawyer conduct in connection
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are more likely to punish sole practitioners or attorneys in small law firms. 3 0 8
However, the reasons that large firm attorneys are rarely disciplined are not clear;
it may have nothing to do with resources. Large firm attorneys may simply not
violate ethics rules as often as small firm attorneys.30 9 Indeed, the SEC's two
public Rule 102(e) investigations of litigation attorneys for "unethical or
improper professional conduct" both involve attorneys at small firms.310 In
addition, while the SEC appears to be allocating more resources to attorney
discipline,311 it is unclear exactly what resources are necessary to effectively
regulate SEC litigator behavior. It may well be that, although there is apparently a
"steady stream" of complaints from the SEC's Division of Enforcement,312 an
independent investigator would determine that only a few complaints merit
serious investigation or prosecution. After all, the SEC managed to enforce the
with complex corporate fraud situations, and such lawyers are lacking in bar counsel offices. The
attorneys they would be prosecuting would almost always be from large law firms that have such
expertise, not to mention the money and the incentive to fight such charges tooth and nail.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also Susan P. Koniak, Corporate Fraud: See, Lawyers, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
195, 215 (2003) (noting that she had never "come across [a] case in which a state bar authority has successfully
challenged the conduct of a big-time securities or corporate lawyer" and attributing that to the state bars' lack of
resources).
308. See, e.g., SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY REGISTRATION &
DISCIPLiNARY COMMIssIoN (2003), http://iardc.org/AnnualReport03/2003annual_report.html (noting that 67%
of lawyers sanctioned in Illinois in 2003 were sole practitioners); Manual R. Ramos, Legal and Law School
Malpractice: Confessions of a Lawyer's Lawyer and Law Professor, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 863, 882 n.62 (1996)
(reporting that during a five-month period in 1994, 55% of attorneys disciplined in California were sole
practitioners); A Perception of Bias in Lawyer Discipline, LEGAL TIMES, June 8, 1992, at 12 (discussing a
Washington, D.C. Court of Appeals Task Force report finding that 83.6 percent of surveyed attorneys who were
the subject of a disciplinary complaint were sole practitioners or worked in small law firms).
309. See Deborah Hansen, Preventing Grievances, 70 "rEx. Bus. J. 724 (2007). Ms. Hansen notes:
Large firms have layers of protection from ethical violations: internal checks and procedures to catch
potential conflict problems, numerous employees to effectively manage ongoing litigation and
communicate with clients (a happy client is unlikely to file a grievance even if the attorney makes a
mistake), and a general lack of funding stressors that might tempt a lawyer to stray from the
profession's ethical guidelines for safeguarding clients' funds.
See also Samual E. Trosow, The Database and the Fields of Law: Are There New Divisions of Labor?, 96 LAW
LiBP, J. 63, 84 n.107 (2004) (stating that structural differences in large law firms may make their attorneys less
prone to disciplinary actions); Julie Rose O'Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Finns? A Response to
Professor Schneyers Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETs-cS 1, 47 (2002); Ramos, supra note 308, at 82 n.62
(noting that although more sole practitioners are disciplined, sole practitioners make up the largest percent of
attorneys).
310. See Altman, Initial Decision Release No. 367, 2009 WL 88063, at *30 n.2 (Jan. 14, 2009) (noting that
an attorney disciplined under Rule 102(e), was at the time of the ethics investigation, a sole practitioner);
Trautman Wasserman & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 55,989, Investment Advisers Release No. 2613,
Investment Company Act Release No. 27,880, 90 SEC Docket 2832, 2835-36 (June 29, 2007) (order denying
petition for interlocutory review) (discussing Rule 102(e) proceeding against Leon B. Borstein). Mr. Borstein
practices at the three attorney firm, Borstein & Sheinbaum. See Borstein & Sheinbaum, http://www.lawyers.com/
borsteinsheinbaum/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
311. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
312. Humes, SEC Speaks 2008, supra note 21.
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securities laws for more than 70 years without investigating litigation attorneys
for unethical or improper professional conduct.
31 3
The SEC, without giving a reason why, has simply argued that the states do a
poor job investigating instances of attorney misconduct. In a 2002 speech,
then-SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt stated that he was "not impressed, or pleased, by
the generally low level of effective responses we receive from state bar
committees when we refer possible disciplinary proceedings to them.
' 314
However, the fact that state bar associations have apparently chosen not to
investigate or bring disciplinary charges based on some SEC referrals, does not
necessarily mean the state disciplinary authorities are not adequately disciplining
attorneys. Following Mr. Pitt's comments, Charles Plattsmier, Chief Disciplinary
Counsel for the Louisiana State Bar Association, revealed that the Louisiana Bar
had received one of the SEC's complaints.31 5 Mr. Plattsmier explained that the
SEC had not provided any evidence to support the complaint.31 6 In that instance,
the SEC seemed to expect the state bar to rely solely on the SEC's conclusion.31 7
Perhaps Mr. Pitt was just frustrated when the state disciplinary authorities
exercise the independence that makes the state authorities a superior avenue for
investigating and disciplining litigation attorneys. I see no reason to conclude that
the state disciplinary authorities cannot effectively investigate and discipline
litigators for ethical violations that occur during the course of an SEC
investigation.
2. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
The, task of investigating SEC litigators for unethical conduct will not fall
solely on the shoulders of state attorney disciplinary staff. Just as the SEC may
refer unethical litigator conduct to the state disciplinary authorities, the SEC may
also refer wrongful conduct to the Department of Justice or local United States
313. See supra Part Ill.A (discussing the progression of cases under Rule 102(e)'s "unethical or improper
professional conduct standard").
314. Harvey Pitt, SEC Chairman, Speech Before the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association (Aug.
12, 2002), available at www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch579.htm. See also Rachel McTague, Pitt Says SEC Will
Take on Assignment of Disciplining Lawyers if State Bars Do Not, 34 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1529 (Sept.
23, 2002) (reporting that Chairman Pitt stated that. "while the SEC makes referrals to state bars in cases in which
lawyers are involved in violations of the securities laws, his records show 'no responses' from state bars in such
cases").
315. Megan Barnett, How to Account for Lawyers, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 9, 2002, at 26. The
Louisiana complaint was one of the eleven complaints the SEC sent to state disciplinary authorities in 2002. Id.
Prior to 2002, the SEC sent state disciplinary authorities only a few complaints a year. Id. It is unclear whether
the SEC has made more complaints in the subsequent years.
316. See id. (explaining that "the SEC was really not much help" because it "simply forwarded a copy of its
consent order against an attorney. . . without the evidence used to reach it.").
317. See id.
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Attorney for criminal investigation.318
A number of criminal statutes prohibit attorneys from acting in ways that may
jeopardize the integrity of the SEC's investigative process. In particular, federal
criminal law prohibits obstructing a pending administrative proceeding,319
suborning perjury,32° tampering with a witness, 321 concealing or destroying
322 32documents, making false statements to investigators, 23 and aiding and
abetting securities law violations.324 While these criminal laws may not reach the
318. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(d) (allowing the SEC to transmit information concerning potential criminal
violations to the Attorney General); SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(explaining that securities laws "explicitly empower the SEC to investigate possible infractions of the securities
laws with a view to both civil and criminal enforcement, and to transmit the fruits of its investigations to [the
Department of] Justice in the event of potential criminal proceedings"); Zathrina Perez, Securities Fraud, 45
AM. CRIm. L. REv. 923, 984 (2008) ("The standard method for determining whether a violation warrants
criminal prosecution requires the SEC to prepare and forward a referral to the DOJ."). Although the SEC has a
formal process that can be used to make criminal referrals, see 17 C.F.R. § 200.19b, the SEC staff typically
makes an informal report by simply calling the relevant criminal authority. See U.S. Gov'T AccouNTAuaIrr
OFF., MUTUAL FUND TRADING ABUSES: SEC CONSISTENTLY APPLIED PROCEDURES IN SETTING PENALTIES, BUT
COULD STRENGTHEN CERTAIN INTERNAL CONTROLS, GAO-05-385, 25-27 (2005).
319. See 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2005).
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences,
obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration
of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the
United States... [sihall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years .... or both.
Id. See also id. § 1503 (prohibiting corruptly obstructing the "due administration of justice"); id.
§ 1512(c)(2) (prohibiting obstruction or attempted obstruction of any official proceeding).
320. See id. § 1621.
Whoever... having taken an oath ... in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an
oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written
testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to
such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true... is guilty of
perjury and shall.., be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
1d.
321. See id. § 1512.
Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts
to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to ... influence, delay,
or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding [or to] be absent from an official
proceeding to which such person has been summoned by legal process... shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
Id. See also id. §§ 1513-15.
322. See id. § 1512(c).
Whoever corruptly ... alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or
attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official
proceeding ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
Id. See also id. § 1519 (prohibiting the alteration or destruction of documents with the intent to obstruct a
proceeding within the jurisdiction of an administrative agency).
323. See id. § 1001.
324. See id. § 2 (providing that anyone who aids or abets an offense against the United States may be
criminally punished as a principal).
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most minor unethical conduct, they are far-reaching. They encompass nearly all
activity that could significantly threaten the SEC's administrative process.
325
Moreover, the penalties for these offenses are not insubstantial. In some
instances, an attorney found guilty could face up to twenty years in prison.326
Once an attorney has been convicted of a crime involving "moral turpitude," the
SEC can impose discipline without conducting its own investigation.327
The SEC has not shown hesitancy in referring obstruction of justice-type cases
to the Department of Justice.328 And the Department of Justice has not shown any
hesitancy in prosecuting them. 329 There is no reason to believe that the
Department of Justice would not zealously investigate and prosecute significant
instances of SEC litigator misconduct.
Of course, a criminal investigation might produce many of the same problems
discussed in Part IV. A criminal investigation of a litigation attorney might create
a conflict of interest, pressure a litigator into less zealous representation, or even
force the attorney to withdraw from representation in the SEC case. Likewise,
when faced with a criminal investigation, a litigator may disclose confidential
information over the objections of his or her client.
However, criminal investigations have distinct advantages over Rule 102(e)
investigations. First, in contrast to Rule 102(e)'s "unethical or improper
professional conduct standard," the criminal laws are generally well defined and
typically cover only egregious conduct.33 ° Criminal laws do not provide the
Department of Justice with significant discretion to investigate minor negligent
325. Indeed, the SEC's current Rule 102(e) investigations of litigation attorneys for destroying documents,
suborning perjury, and obstructing justice (see supra note 19 and accompanying text) would all be covered by
criminal statutes.
326. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c), 1519.
327. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(2) (2006).
328. According to one group of securities attorneys:
Lying to the SEC staff is treated very seriously and will often persuade the SEC to make a criminal
referral even where the substantive violation is marginal. Indeed, the SEC has not only referred cases
for substantive violations, but also for perjury, obstruction of justice and making false statements.
These cases can have a wide variety of factual bases, including lying under oath, intentionally
withholding documents responsive to a subpoena, lying to the [s]taff during a telephone interview,
and influencing others to lie to the SEC. Violations of this nature will practically guarantee a criminal
referral.
LAWRENCE J. ZWEIFACH ET AL, SECuRrEs LrIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INsTIurE 2007: RECENT DEVELOP-
MENTS IN THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF FEDERAL SECuRrITEs LAW VIOLATIONS 753, 761.
329. The SEC has brought a number of high-profile cases using the obstruction laws to punish those
suspected of securities law violations. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen L.L.P. v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005)
(overturning the conviction of accounting firm Arthur Andersen, whom the Department of Justice prosecuted
under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)); United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273 (2nd Cir. 2006) (upholding Martha Stewart's
conviction of, among other things, obstructing an agency proceeding).
330. Some have argued that the obstruction laws are too broad and do not provide sufficient notice of the
type of conduct prohibited. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, On the Prospects of Deterring Corporate Crime, 2 J.
Bus. & ThcH. L. 25, 28-29 (2007). While it is true that the obstruction laws cover a wide variety of conduct, one
need only compare Part m's discussion of the uncertain standards for litigator conduct under Rule 102(e) with
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conduct that has little practical effect on the SEC's investigation. 331 As a result, to
the extent a criminal investigation harms a client, we can take comfort in
knowing that the investigation relates to egregious conduct.3 32 Criminal laws do
not provide the opportunity for overreaching that Rule 102(e) currently does.
The other major advantage of criminal investigations is that the Department of
Justice and United States Attorneys, like state bars, exercise independent
judgment.33 3 If the SEC refers a frivolous complaint to the criminal authorities,
the criminal authorities need not investigate.334 In fact, the Department of Justice
regularly declines to prosecute referrals from the SEC.3 35 Because the Depart-
ment of Justice exercises independent judgment, it is less likely that the
Department of Justice will investigate a litigator for the sole purpose of building
the SEC's case against the litigator's client.336
In sum, state attorney disciplinary systems and criminal authorities can
effectively investigate and discipline litigation attorneys for ethical violations
that occur during the course of an SEC investigation. Allowing disciplinary and
criminal authorities to handle the investigations eliminates harm to attorneys and
clients that can occur under Rule 102(e).337
the specific conduct prohibited in the criminal laws (see. notes 319-24) to determine that, vague as the
obstruction laws might be, they still provide more guidance than Rule 102(e).
331. This does not leave litigators immune from punishment for conduct that, although minor, is
nevertheless unethical. As explained in Part V.C.1, state disciplinary authorities can investigate and sanction
attorneys for a variety of unethical conduct.
332. In addition, by letting the Department of Justice prosecute criminal perjury and obstruction cases, we
can ensure that those who interfere with SEC investigations are treated similarly to those who interfere with
other agencies' proceedings. See Neil Devins & Michael Harris, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice
Control of Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 600 (2003).
333. See Perez, supra 318, at 984.
334. U.S. ATT'Y MANUAL § 9-2.020, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foiareadingroom/usam/
title9/2mcrm.htm#9-2.020 (last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
335. Devins & Harris, supra note 332, at 561-62 (noting that the Department of Justice declines to prosecute
a significant number of SEC referrals); Clifton Leaf, Enough is Enough: White-Collar Criminals: They Lie They
Cheat They Steal and They've Been Getting Away With it for Too Long, FORTUNE, March 18, 2002, at 60, 64
(reporting that between 1992 and 2001, the SEC's Division of Enforcement referred 609 cases to the
Department of Justice with 525 resulting in criminal prosecutions).
336. This is not to say that there is no danger of overreaching by the Department of Justice. Because the
Department of Justice is tasked with prosecuting violations of criminal securities laws, it is not uncommon for
the Department of Justice to investigate a client who is also being investigated by the SEC. See, e.g., SEC v.
Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1980). During these parallel investigations, the Department
of Justice and the SEC routinely share information. See generally Ralph C. Ferrara & David A. Garcia, Meeting
in Dark Comers and Strange Places: Scheming Between the SEC and the Department of Justice, 38 SEC. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) 1332 (2006). It is certainly possible that the Department of Justice might investigate litigators
in order to build a criminal case against the litigator's client. Cf Lance Cole, Revoking Privileges: Federal Law
Enforcement's Multi-Front Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege (and Why it is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REv.
469, 554-60 (2003) (asserting that the Department of Justice unnecessarily subpoenas attorney testimony in
order to build criminal cases). However, the danger of overreaching by the Department of Justice is less because
they are cabined by more concrete rules. See supra notes 330-32 and accompanying text.
337. Clients themselves can also play a role in assuring that their attorney acts in an ethical manner. Criminal
defendants have long brought malpractice cases against attorneys for professional negligence that violates
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VI. CONCLUSION
"Divide and conquer" is an old military strategy.338 The theory is that by
dividing your adversary into smaller parts, you can use a smaller force to defeat
each of the parts.3 3 9 Rule 102(e) allows the SEC to divide clients from their
attorneys by investigating attorneys for professional misconduct.3 1n  When the
SEC investigates a litigation attorney, it shifts the balance of power in the
adversary process and allows the SEC to build the case against the litigator's
client with less effort. Investigation of a litigation attorney undermines safe-
guards that were implemented to ensure that the adversary process is fair-the
right to counsel of choice and the attorney-client privilege. Because there are
other effective avenues available for litigator discipline, there is no need for the
SEC to investigate litigation attorneys for "unethical or improper professional
conduct." If, however, the SEC continues to investigate litigation attorneys,
Congress and the SEC should implement statutory and regulatory changes to
protect attorneys and their clients.
ethical rules. See, e.g., Lawson v. Nugent, 702 F. Supp. 81 (D.N.J. 1988) (providing bad advice); Canady v.
Schwartz, 577 N.E.2d 437 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (failing to adequately research). See also Thomas Morgan,
Sarbanes-Oxley: A Complication, Not a Contribution, In the Effort to Improve Corporate Lawyers'Professional
Conduct, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 1, 8 (2003) ("[C]ivil liability has long replaced professional discipline as the
principal means of enforcement of professional standards."); John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and
Professional Responsibility, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 101, 102 (1995) (arguing that "[t]he time has come to consider
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